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ABSTRACT 
The terror attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, necessitated changes 
in the way domestic intelligence agencies and services conducted information collection 
activities to protect against further attacks.  Congress acted quickly to prevent the next 
attack by expanding government authority under the USA PATRIOT ACT and the 
Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court.  This gave domestic intelligence services the 
tools needed due to advances in technology that allowed terror organizations and suspects 
to travel, communicate, raise money and recruit using the Internet.  Safeguards were 
written into the enhanced authority to protect against privacy abuses by government. 
Ten years after 9/11, civil liberties advocates called for more transparency, more 
privacy protections and better oversight because of past abuses by government officials 
operating in the name of national security.  Leaks about government spying on U.S. 
citizens have heightened the balance debate between security and privacy.  Privacy or 
security is not a zero sum game.  A policy that incorporates an adversarial process in the 
FISC and a streamlined oversight mechanism in Congress for more effective oversight, 
and the release of redacted classified documents to educate the public about surveillance 
techniques, would instill more balance and greater public trust. 
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The debate on how to maintain a balance between security and privacy in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks rages on after revelations that intelligence services and 
agencies amassed a vast collection of data on Americans not suspected of terror or 
criminal involvement. Expanded interpretations of the new laws governing data 
collection under the USA PATRIOT Act by domestic intelligence officials have led to 
calls by privacy advocates for more transparency, more protections and more effective 
congressional oversight.  A lack of candid testimony by intelligence officials about 
methods used by government agencies has lessened pubic trust about these techniques.  
Congress has responded by conducting hearings into government data collection 
on Americans not suspected of terror or other criminal activity.  Members from both 
sides of the aisle are threatening changes that would hamper domestic intelligence efforts.  
Courts are weighing in as well.  The concern is that if some changes are not made and 
accepted by the executive branch to better balance privacy and security then change will 
be forced on them.  This would put intelligence efforts at a disadvantage in preventing, 
deterring, disrupting and identifying terror plans and identifying suspects. Momentum is 
on the side of greater privacy protections. The argument of conducting vast data 
collection by domestic intelligence officials in the name of national security is being lost.  
This thesis offers a better way forward in light of the controversy surrounding 
domestic intelligence data collection methods, and incorporates the needs of three 
identified stakeholder groups:  Privacy Advocates, Domestic Intelligence Officials, and 
Congress/Courts. 
Three policy options are examined and a policy alternative presented that will 
better balance security and privacy and restore public confidence: 
 Maintaining the status quo of data collection by domestic intelligence 
agencies. 
 Creating a single integrated domestic intelligence service to replace the 
disparate approach currently used. 
 xvi
 A streamlined congressional oversight process with one House and one 
Senate committee responsible for oversight that replaces the estimated 88 
committees and sub-committees currently overseeing these entities, and 
inserting an adversarial process into the FISC for warrant and wiretap 
applications. 
The policy recommended contains a blend of the three options presented.  It 
maintains enhanced surveillance methods, and for balance needed to protect privacy, 
includes more transparency and trust with an adversarial process in the warrant and 
wiretap application process.  The policy option includes more effective oversight by a 
more frequent release of classified documents that have been redacted to protect secrets 
when officials brief streamlined congressional oversight committees. 
 xvii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
At one time in this great country, it was against the law to educate “Negroes” as 
they called them.  Any attempt to educate slaves had to occur underground.  Many of the 
early abolitionists, like Frederick Douglas, were self taught. It was frowned upon to teach 
slaves to read and write.  The prevailing orthodoxy at the time was that education would 
open the eyes of slaves and that it would incite rebellion toward their oppressors, and 
eventually they would demand their freedom.  The following language actually appeared 
in the State of Virginia statutes (Revised Code of 1819). 
That all meetings or assemblages of slaves, or free negroes or mulattoes 
mixing and associating with such slaves at any meeting-house or houses, 
&c., in the night; or at any SCHOOL OR SCHOOLS for teaching them 
READING OR WRITING, either in the day or night, under whatsoever 
pretext, shall be deemed and considered an UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY; and 
any justice of a county, &c., wherein such assemblage shall be, either 
from his own knowledge or the information of others, of such unlawful 
assemblage, &c., may issue his warrant, directed to any sworn officer or 
officers, authorizing him or them to enter the house or houses where such 
unlawful assemblages, &c., may be, for the purpose of apprehending or 
dispersing such slaves, and to inflict corporal punishment on the offender 
or offenders, at the discretion of any justice of the peace, not exceeding 
twenty lashes. 
Education opens minds. It teaches people to think for themselves, it connects 
people to the past and prepares them for the future.  Education has always been the 
vehicle to upward mobility in the United States. With this in mind I want to thank the 
following people. 
First, I want to thank my parents who understood the value of an education and 
poured what little money they had into providing me with a solid educational base. They 
knew that, in a sometimes unfair and unjust world that I would have to be doubly-
prepared to overcome obstacles. 
This Master’s Program from the renowned Center for Homeland Defense and 
Security at the Naval Postgraduate School fulfills the promise I made to my parents to see 
 
 xviii
education as a life-long learning endeavor, even at this stage in my life, and having 
already reached the top level of my local law enforcement career.  This achievement is 
more about the future. 
Nobody accomplishes anything of value without tremendous love, patience, 
understanding, and support of the people around them. I want to thank the staff at the 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security. The staff does the logistics that many think 
just happen. Things like travel arrangements, reimbursements, and class materials take on 
added importance when traveling across the country, which for two-week segments is no 
easy task. I want to thank the teaching staff and will not try to name every one for fear of 
leaving someone out, but a hardy thank you, nonetheless.  
I do want to point out my thesis advisors, however, for special thanks.  Captain 
Robert Simeral and Dr. Chris Bellavita stuck with me.  I know I made this challenging to 
them and left them shaking their heads on more than one occasion. They held my hand 
throughout the process, and I will be forever indebted for their patience. 
To cohort 1201 and 1202, I want to say that your support and friendship during 
the last 18 months made the long weeks away from home less stressful. We were all 
experiencing the same situations while away from family. I hope to continue these 
relationships in the future. Good luck, and God Bless you as your life’s journey proceeds.  
A special thank you goes out to my Executive Assistant Dawn Colla.  A proof 
reader extraordinaire, she looked over every paper that I submitted and always found 
corrections that I could not have, even after re-reading it three times over.  She should 
have been an English teacher. 
Last but not least I want to thank my wife Julie. You have been a steadying force 
during this program. Your patience, love, and encouragement allowed me to grind it out! 
You epitomize the saying that ‘beside every man who accomplishes great things in life 
stands a woman who deserves sainthood!’  I can only hope to return to you in your 
endeavors what you have done in mine. I look forward to the transition of student back to 




This thesis will examine domestic intelligence operations and other government 
activities that address the issue of maintaining the rule of law, while at the same time 
strengthening government’s duty to prevent, deter, and disrupt terror plots, and identify 
terror cells and suspects post 9/11.1  The USA PATRIOT Act that expanded government 
authority in the area of communication surveillance for a new kind of threat, is being 
debated in Congress in terms of how far domestic intelligence agencies are intruding into 
the lives of not only international citizens, but American citizens as well.2 
There are issues about government overreach and encroachment into the privacy 
and civil liberties of American citizens. Congress expressed concerns over privacy and 
civil liberty implications by conducting hearings and passing laws.  For example, Public 
Law 108-7 stopped all funding for the proposed Total Information Awareness (TIA) 
program, a sophisticated information technology program that collects, stores, and 
analyzes information, until the Pentagon could prove that the program does not violate 
privacy rights.3  Congress has also criticized the Transportation Security Agency’s 
Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II that produces realistic full-body 
images because it potentially impacts the public’s right to privacy and civil liberties.4   
Critics have labeled the program virtual strip searches.5 
                                                 
1Philip Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century, (New York: First Anchor 
Books, 2009), 290. 
2Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics, (Washington D.C.: 
CQ Press, 2007), 104. 
3United States Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, 2003: DoD addressing 
concerns of Senators Grassley, Nelson and Hagel on safeguards against governmental abuse of power in 
developing technology programs, United States Department of Defense, 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=443324. 
4 Ibid., 5. 
5 CNN report that criticizes body scanners as too revealing, http://fox6now.com,tsa-removes-body-
scanners-criticized-as-too-revealing, 1. 
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Totally reshaping intelligence on the basis of what happened on September 11, 
2001, and what was learned in the days following, is not good public policy.6  It doesn’t 
allow for considering the ramification of these changes and what new problems will arise 
as a consequence to wholesale changes. 
The focus of this thesis will be to determine, through policy analysis, what policy 
options might better accomplish a balance between security and civil liberty in domestic 
intelligence operations that seem to be tipping the scales toward security and away from 
privacy, a decade after 9/11.   
Authors, academics, and former intelligence veterans have written papers, books, 
essays, and journals on the danger of government intrusion into constitutionally protected 
areas, and how to balance that with providing law enforcement needed tools to protect 
against terror.7  Former Secretary of State Colin Powell said, 
Terrorists are dangerous criminals and we must deal with them, but the 
only thing that can really destroy us is us.  It is time for Congress to make 
the secrecy problem an issue of the highest priority and enact a sweeping 
overhaul of the national security establishment to re-impose democratic 
controls.8 
Privacy and protecting the United States from terror are not polar opposites.9  
Many agree that the balance will change as the terror threat evolves, but that Congress 
must exert its power to monitor and regulate national security initiatives with more 
effective oversight.10  Some have suggested the creation of a single intelligence-
integrated community modeled after MI5 in the UK.11  Concerns about domestic spying 
                                                 
6 Jennifer E. Sims, and Gerber Berton, Transforming U.S. Intelligence, (Washington, D.C.:  
Georgetown University Press, 2005), 18. 
7 Bobbitt, Terror and Consent: The Wars for The Twenty-First Century. 289. 
8 Michael German, and Stanley Jay, Drastic Measures Required: Congress Needs to Overhaul U.S. 
Secrecy Laws and Increase Oversight of the Secret Security Establishment, American Civil Liberties 
Union, (September 2011), http://aclu.org/files/assets/secrecyreport_20110727.pdf. 
9 Samuel H.Clovis, Jr., Letter to the Editor: Twelve Questions Answered, Clovis answers questions 
from Chris Bellavita regarding Homeland Security, (May 2010), Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center 
for Homeland Defense and Security, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=34925. 
10 German and Stanley, Drastic Measures Required, 3. 
11 Richard A. Best, Intelligence Reform After Five Years: The Role of the Director of National 
Intelligence. 
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have long been debated.  In the 1990s, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan called for the 
outright abolition of the CIA on the grounds that it had demonstrated it uselessness for 
failing to forecast the fall of the Soviet Union.12  There was an anti-intelligence sentiment 
growing in the public domain and Congress after the Cold War ended.13 
That pushback is manifesting itself again with the recent disclosure by Edward 
Snowden, a government contract employee, that government may be stretching the 
meaning and interpretation of the rule of law.14  On September 11, 2001, America was 
forced to face a new threat requiring new rules, after terrorists attacked the United States 
homeland. 
Civil liberty advocates believe that domestic intelligence agencies working in so 
much secrecy are untrustworthy, and that it is an abandonment of a core American 
principle that a government working for the people and by the people must be transparent 
to the people.15  A lack of transparency is problematic according to stakeholders 
representing civil liberty advocates, because in a democracy legitimacy of government 
action emerges from a process that is deliberate and largely open to the public.16  Like the 
intelligence process at the national level, the domestic intelligence process used at the 




                                                 
12 Loch K. Johnson, The Aspin-Brown Intelligence Inquiry: Behind the Closed Doors of a Blue 
Ribbon Commission, Center for the Study of Intelligence, https://www.cia.gov/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence, 2. 
13 L. Britt Snider, A Different Angle on the Aspin-Brown Commission, Center for the Study of 
Intelligence. 
14Threats Test Obama’s Balancing Act on Surveillance, New York Times, News story details 
President Obama’s attempt to get control of the debate of balance and security after NSA contract 
employee Edward Snowden leaked classified documents about domestic intelligence surveillance activities. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/10/us/threats-test-obamas-balancing-act-on-
surveillance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
15 American Civil Liberties Union, Insatiable Appetite: The Government’s Demand for New and 
Unnecessary Powers after September 11, (October 2002), https://aclu.org/FilesPDFs/insatiable appetite 
final.pdf, 1. 
16 Ibid., 14. 
 4
which enforces the law, to insulate itself from public criticism, congressional and judicial 
oversight, which increases the likelihood of improper, unwise and illegal activity.17 
 
                                                 
17Elizabeth Goitein, and David M. Shapiro, Reducing Overclassification Through Accountability, 
Brennan Center for Justice, (2011), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=689494, 10. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
“He who would sacrifice liberty for security deserves neither liberty nor security.” 
Benjamin Franklin 
A. GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES, TRANSPARENCY, 
PRIVACY ISSUES 
This chapter will describe major issues surrounding public policy enactments 
following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, including providing domestic 
intelligence agencies new tools for surveillance, and identifying what safeguards are 
needed as a check on expanded government authority, and the impact that resulted in the 
balance between security and liberty.  The issues are:  
 Privacy surrounding government surveillance authority in the digital age, 
classifying government activity in a veil of secrecy, and  
 Calls for more transparency, an adversarial court mechanism and 
congressional oversight that will re-establish trust in government. The cost 
concerning these methods will also be analyzed.   
The terror attacks against the United States on 9/11 and the Commission Report 
that followed caused major changes in the way the government goes about protecting 
Americans and the nation from further attack, and called for government to increase its 
presence in our lives.18  A major finding by the Commission was that there were barriers 
to effective information sharing between federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies called stovepipes, and these may have contributed to intelligence failure of 9/11.  
A quick reorganization was set up to bridge information sharing between law 





                                                 
18 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, (2004), 
http://www.911commission.gov/about/index.htm. 
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obtain clarity about the deficiencies that existed.19  The Commission Report indicated the 
need for expanded government authority into areas that are constitutionally protected, in 
order to prevent future terror attacks.20 
United States domestic intelligence operations and activities have an important 
role in protecting the American people from foreign and domestic threats that can affect 
the economic, physical and psychological well being of the country.  This same domestic 
intelligence enterprise has a history of abusing, overreaching and infringing on civil 
liberty protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, with unlawful wiretaps and 
surveillance as was discovered when the FBI spied on a wide range of political figures 
and organizations between 1956 and 1971.21 
B. COMPETING INTERESTS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
The problem to be addressed is how a system can guard itself against terror events 
both man-made and natural, and which are intrusive, rare, unpredictable, and very 
costly.22  The basis for this thesis is to make the argument on a policy recommendation 
for what can be called a wicked problem of simultaneously allowing agencies that have 
domestic intelligence responsibility the latitude they need to prevent, deter and preempt 
terror attacks, and ensuring that our privacy and civil liberties are kept intact, so that the 
foundation of limited government on which this country was established remains 
protected.23 
The natural reaction for government (presidents) in a time of war is to seize power 
for itself, sometimes overreaching, citing national security interests as the reason.  For 
example, Abraham Lincoln suspended Habeas Corpus during the Civil War, and 
                                                 
19 Ronald R. Stimeare, Is it Really Possible to Prevent Interagency Information-Sharing from 
Becoming an Oxymoron? Army War College, (March 2005), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=459181, iii. 
20 Raphael Perl, National Commission on Terrorism Report: Background and Issues for Congress, 
(Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, RS20598, February 2001), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=144. 
21The 9/11 Commission Report, Location 312 of 2567, Chapter 3. 
22Kettl, System Under Stress, 84. 
23 Wicked problems are those that are difficult to solve because the information is often incomplete, 
contradictory and constantly changing.  http://www.ac4d.com/home/philosophy/understanding-wicked-
problems/. 
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President Franklin Roosevelt issued a detainment order in WW II of Japanese citizens.24  
Between 1960 and 1974, the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover, conducted surveillance and kept 
files on millions of Americans, including Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., (who was viewed as 
a potential threat), and other “subversives,” all without a court conviction or court 
authority.25 
The 9/11 terror attack on the United States was one of those situations where 
government officials felt a need to seize more power and engage in activities that appear 
to encroach on civil liberty and privacy in the name of national security interests.  Today 
we call it homeland security.26 
Foreign terror suspects were able to organize, plan and carry out the hijacking of 
four U.S. commercial airliners and fly them into the World Trade Center towers in New 
York City, and into the Pentagon.  They killed nearly 3,000 people, shutting down the 
entire commercial airline industry for several days, and severely damaging the United 
States economy with damage estimates placed around $90 billion.27  They were able to 
accomplish this using American travel, banking and communications systems.28  There 
existed no coordinated way of tying this information together that could either track the 
suspects or identify a terror plot. 
C. CONGRESS RESPONDS TO 9/11 
The 9/11 Commission (The Commission) studied the pre-events of September 11, 
2001, and it assessed the conditions, the agencies, the environment and the series of 
events that may have led to the attacks.29  One of the findings from the commission was 
                                                 
24George W. Bush, Decisions Points, (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), Kindle loc 3053. 
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that a reorganization of the intelligence community was needed.30  This would not be the 
first attempt of this kind.  The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA) followed, and this law finally achieved what many reform efforts had attempted 
since the passing of the National Security Act of 1947.31 
New relationships were fused between agencies that previously could not or did 
not share information, referred to by some as the wall.32  The problem was that no formal 
mechanism existed to share information.  Information shortcomings referred to as stove 
piping--where information within an agency travels up and down in an organization with 
little sharing horizontally between organizations--prevented the reporting out of counter 
terror information.33  It is hard to break down stovepipes when there are so many stoves 
that are legally and politically entitled to have cast iron pipes of their own.34  The 
objective by the Commission was to replace a “need to know” culture with a “need to 
share” culture.35 
An entire new federal agency, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was 
created to be the lead agency for problems that featured so prominently in the 9/11 
attacks, such as border protection, securing transportation, immigration, Customs Service, 
critical infrastructure and organizing assistance to critical incidents.36  The idea was to 
unify homeland security efforts from the current patchwork approach.37  Fusions Centers 
and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) were created at the state and local level to 
improve collection, analysis, reporting and sharing of information between local law 
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enforcement agencies, the FBI and the DHS.  This relationship coordinated by DHS 
would make state and local law enforcement a new player in counterterrorism 
investigations.38 
Prior to 9/11, no executive department had as its first priority, the job of 
defending America from domestic attack.39 The FBI was designated as the lead agency 
responsible for domestic intelligence.40  Some have questioned whether the FBI is the 
appropriate agency for intelligence investigations because its culture and design are to 
gather evidence for arrest and prosecution, not on-going intelligence production.41  This 
sensitivity to conducting investigations in compliance with the law has built in safeguards 
for privacy and civil liberty protection because the FBI has a cultural tendency to err on 
the side of doing everything by the book, evidenced by the Mohammed Atta investigation 
prior to 9/11.42 
The Boston Marathon bombing, Fort Hood terror incident involving Nidal Hassan 
and the FBI’s role in 9/11 with the Phoenix memo and known terrorist Zacharias 
Moussoui, demonstrate what can happen when a downstream agency like the FBI, that 
reviews past events as a basis for prosecution, instead of an upstream agency like MI5 
that looks at information that may inform about future events, is designated with 
intelligence responsibility.43  Intelligence services had information about the actors in 
these events before they were carried out.44 
D. HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH ENCROACHMENT AND WHAT 
OVERSIGHT IS NECESSARY? 
A central question surrounding domestic intelligence post 9/11 is how much 
encroachment into the affairs of private citizens will Congress, courts, and the public 
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allow in conducting sensitive investigations, while not impeding the ability of domestic 
intelligence agencies to disrupt terror plans and identify suspects.45  Whether Congress, 
the courts or public opinion should make those decisions has not been resolved, as 56% 
of Americans in a poll taken in July 2013, say that the federal courts fail to provide 
adequate limits on data collection and that mirrors the sentiment in Congress.46 
Several pieces of legislation are being proposed that would curtail the seizing of 
metadata on Americans not suspected of terror involvement or any other crime.  Metadata 
is the envelope of a phone call or Internet communication.47  For a phone call it could 
include the duration of a call, the phone numbers involved, and when it happened.  For an 
email it would include the sender and recipient, time, but not the subject or content, and 
in both cases it could include location information. Republican Congressman Justin 
Amash and Democrat Congressman John Conyers have introduced The LIBERT-E Act 
that would require the NSA to have a specific target if it is seeking phone records.48 
The National Security Agency’s (NSA) PRISM program has civil liberty 
advocates and members of Congress also asking whether these operations have gone too 
far.49  The Commission Report initially pointed out the need to balance the interest of 
protecting the homeland and ensuring civil liberty protection when they said that the 
choice between liberty and security is a false one.50  After the leak of the NSA secrets 
detailing the spying on American citizens who have not been accused of terror 
involvement, President Barack Obama in an interview stated that we cannot have 100% 
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security and 100% privacy with zero inconvenience.  These contradictory statements 
exemplify the competing opinions surrounding the balance of liberty and freedom.51 
E. REORGANIZING U.S. INTELLIGENCE RAISES PRIVACY ISSUES  
The only agency at the time of 9/11 with an intelligence role or authorization 
inside the United States was the FBI, and it was mainly in the area of 
counterintelligence.52  Previous spying operations on U.S. citizens and groups led to 
congressional investigations that resulted in reform measures that prohibited the FBI 
from engaging in these operations, as well as prohibiting the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) from collaborating with the FBI or engaging in operations within the United States. 
This raises the question about whether an integrated intelligence service would provide a 
better unity of effort, or through a model such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, a paradigm 
for resolving large-scale bureaucratic problems.53 
After the 9/11 attacks, federal law enforcement agencies, security services and the 
White House sought more authority and tools in order to be more effective in countering 
the emerging threat of terror being used as a tactic against the United States.54   The 
World Trade Center bombing in 1993 was the first attack from this emerging adversary, 
but at the time the capability and intentions of the organization, identified as al Qaeda, 
was not yet clearly understood by the national intelligence community.55 
F. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
President George W. Bush declared a Global War on Terror (GWOT) soon after 
September 11, 2001.  In framing it that way it gave the President, as Commander in 
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Chief, authority under the War Powers Act to take action almost unilaterally to protect 
the homeland without authorization or pre-notification to Congress.  For example, the use 
of Predator Drones to kill foreign terrorists abroad, a tactic used by President George W. 
Bush, has been expanded by President Barack Obama to include killing American 
citizens abroad without due process.56  Might that eventually go on to include the use of 
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EIT) with Americans detained and suspected of 
terror involvement?  The use of EIT such as sleep deprivation, hunger, water-boarding, 
long periods of standing harsh lights and excessive noise, to obtain vital information that 
might save thousands of American lives, has caused controversy and debate in Congress 
and the public about human rights violations.57    There are legal and moral arguments for 
and against the use of torture as a tactic in obtaining vital information from enemy 
combatants.58  As writer Mark Bowden put it, “The most effective way to gather 
intelligence and thwart terrorism can also be a direct route into morally repugnant 
terrain.”59 
The pattern has been that each succeeding U.S. president uses the policies that 
have been established before them, and then expands them to meet their own objectives 
or their own interpretations.60  There ends up being an expansion of government authority 
and very little contraction where rights are restored to pre-crisis event status, especially 
with a War On Terrorism that likely has no end.61  Various presidents get different 
interpretations of Article II of the US Constitution from White House lawyers.62  Lincoln 
wiretapped telegraph machines during the Civil War, Woodrow Wilson ordered the 
interception of nearly every telephone and telegraph message into or out of the United 
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States during WW I, and Franklin Roosevelt allowed the military to read and censor 
communications during WW II.63  The NSA collecting metadata on American citizens 
not suspected of terror has a similar theme.        
Terror organizations like Al Qaeda, unlike nation states that the U.S. intelligence 
community had become accustomed to facing, are for the most part, stealth and 
sophisticated operations and tend to operate in a decentralized structure.64  Being 
decentralized means that they have spiritual and cultural leaders but no formal ones, and 
members do not necessarily take orders on when and how to attack adversaries.65  These 
characteristics make terror organizations hard to track or identify, or to know when and 
where the next attack might be.66  A terror group’s network includes leadership roles, 
fundraisers, document forgers, bomb makers and recruiters.67 Taking out or weakening 
one of these elements can disrupt a terror organization at least temporarily.68  Because 
terrorists operate from a senseless state, information about them is difficult to identify 
because it ebbs and flows among ordinary people.69 
In order for the agencies responsible for detecting, deterring, disrupting and 
preventing terror plots to identify those involved in the plan, law enforcement agencies 
need a more flexible process to deal with the emergence of the digital age in 
communications.70  With advances in technology and the rights approvals, government 
can capture a person’s digital exhaust, which is revealing data a human being leaves 
behind through activities like credit card purchases, cell phone use, Internet use and 
information on flying and driving from state to state.71  Innovation means a more 
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streamlined process for securing the authority to obtain authorization for wiretaps and 
warrants so that time and resources can be efficiently managed.72  These efficiencies 
however create privacy and civil liberty concerns because they short-circuit the 
traditional deliberate court approval process in place before 9/11.  
G. CONGRESS PROVIDES FOR ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE 
AUTHORITY 
The Patriot Act became the tool, the authority and the process to carry out 
necessary law enforcement activities and was intended to provide the judicial oversight 
needed to ensure privacy and civil liberty protection.73  That satisfied the security issues 
but created a new dilemma. The Commission knew that abuses of civil liberties could 
create a backlash that would impair the collection of needed information.74  These 
activities require that government engage in surveillance into constitutionally protected 
areas that then result in collection and recordkeeping on American citizens.  Former DHS 
Secretary Michael Chertoff admits that by its very nature, domestic and homeland 
security intelligence work is intrusive.75 
The USA PATRIOT Act has received much attention from civil liberty groups 
about government overreach in the area of privacy and civil liberty in the name of 
national security.76  This law was put together without much debate, discussion or 
deliberation and voted into law nearly unanimously.77   It has been described by 
psychologists studying the impact of terror on policy decisions made post 9/11 as fear-
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driven public policy.78  This fear forces people to do things that they might not otherwise 
do except for the feeling of having to make a hurried decision. 
A problem in getting coherent thinking on the risk of terrorism is that politicians 
find extreme and alarmist possibilities so much more appealing than discussions of 
broader context, much less of statistical reality.  Hysteria and alarmism rarely make much 
sense but politicians and the media are drawn to them.79  Psychology shows that when 
people feel vulnerable they are more likely to be trusting of government and give away 
rights without question.  This psychology points out that aspects of fear can strongly 
influence the public’s trust in and support of certain government policy that may not be in 
their best interest.80 
Some of the complaints centered around the secrecy of not only the investigations 
and activities, but the actions approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts 
(FISC) under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).81  The action of these 
courts are not adversarial, the wiretaps and warrants have been nearly unanimously 
approved, are not able to be appealed, and are sealed indefinitely to protect national 
security interests.82 
This lack of transparency causes mistrust and can be a barrier to effective 
oversight by congressional committees tasked with this responsibility.  This area of 
intelligence operations needs more discussion and debate according to civil liberty groups 
and members of Congress.83  Congress and the public do not argue about the need to 
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protect people and to keep most activities confidential, but a policy needs to be put in 
place as a check on government overreach.  Just trusting the government to do the right 
thing and to let the American people and Congress know when mistakes are made, 
sounds good, but it is not good public policy in terms of transparency or privacy and civil 
liberty protections.84 
H. STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS AND JOINT TERRORISM 
TASK FORCES 
Another area of concern by civil liberty advocates about the domestic 
counterintelligence apparatus, is privacy, and the activities of state and local fusion 
centers.  After 9/11, pressure grew for a larger state role in counterterrorism.85  The 
growth in the number of fusion centers after 9/11 added another layer of disparate local 
agencies that were collecting potentially valuable counter-terror information.  Oversight, 
unity of effort, and a standard way of doing things to ensure privacy protections needed 
to be addressed.  Local law enforcement plays a significant role in the homeland security 
enterprise.  According to the DHS, there are 78 fusion centers with 70 Intelligence 
Officers (IO) assigned.86  DHS officials indicate that state and local fusion centers are 
vital to protecting the homeland and produce intelligence products that are shared across 
this enterprise.  They are at the front line in the collection and analysis phase; they are the 
eyes and ears in the field. 
Civil liberties advocates questioned whether oversight of this added player in the 
domestic intelligence apparatus was adequate. They contended that the creation of new 
institutions like state and local fusion centers must be planned in a public, open manner 
 
with carefully thought-out and debated implications for privacy and other key values 
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important in a democracy.87 This thesis will examine the consequences of unbridled 
authority by domestic intelligence agencies.  
Intelligence fusion centers grew in popularity at the local level as officers tried to 
establish a role in defending the homeland by developing their own intelligence 
capabilities.88  This expansion took place outside any legal framework for regulation, 
leading to a disparate collection of centers, defining their own mission and tailored to 
meet local or regional needs89 This allows fusion centers to operate in what has been 
described as no man’s land with little public oversight or standardized training, rules, or 
policies.90  The missions, objectives, standards of operation and policies are all different, 
leading to the potential for privacy and civil liberty abuses.   
DHS and the FBI are the primary sources of information between state and local 
law enforcement and are responsible for coordinating such a vast pool of disparate local 
and private agencies.91  In a recent Congressional hearing however, one DHS official 
described the fusion center as the “wild west,” where officials are free to use a variety of 
technologies before politics catches up and limits the options.92  For example, the use of 
tracking devices by local law enforcement without a search warrant brought privacy 
rights into question.  Federal authorities are happy to reap the benefits of working with 
fusion centers without officially taking ownership.93  
In October 2012, a congressional study by the Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs Committee had some members of Congress raising questions about 
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the effectiveness of fusion centers in the area of counterintelligence capability.94  
Originally designed with the intention of improving counterintelligence collection and 
analysis, their mission has morphed into an all-crimes drive focus with little produced in 
the way of counterterrorism intelligence.95 
The National Association of Fusion Centers authored a letter countering the 
senate subcommittee study, and in it denied many of the findings and reaffirmed their 
value to their local communities, but offered only rhetorical claims of substantial value in 
the area of counterintelligence or counterterrorism.96  An article that appeared in Police 
Chief magazine on the role of fusion centers in counterterrorism operations sounded a 
conflicting message when it indicated that detailed analysis of counterterrorism 
intelligence is not the role of fusion centers.97  This serves as another example for 
examining the benefits of a single, integrated domestic intelligence agency for unity of 
effort. 
The focus of the questions being asked by the senate permanent subcommittee on 
investigations was whether fusion centers need more standardization of policies and 
procedures, about training of officers for proficiency and competency in the area of 
privacy and civil liberty protections, and about the poor quality of the reports that are 
submitted for sharing purposes.98 
Gaps in information sharing continue to plague domestic intelligence and 
counterterrorism operations.  The 9/11 Commission talked about the need for unity of 
effort and unity of command in intelligence and counterterrorism operations overseas and 
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at home.99  Whether the domestic intelligence approach using fragmented federal, state 
and local law enforcement agencies can bridge the divide for a better flow of information 
up, down and across the enterprise will be examined in the policy options section of this 
thesis.  An analysis of whether the United Kingdom approach to an integrated 
intelligence agency (MI5) would work in the U.S. will be proposed in Chapter IV.  The 
Goldwater-Nichols reform legislation of 1986, that brought joint capability to the then 
fragmented military, has been proposed as a way forward to achieve integration among 
agencies with similar objectives, like law enforcement.100 
Congress was contemplating pulling back on all state and local fusion center 
funding after it learned that very little valuable counterterrorism intelligence was 
emanating from fusion centers.101 Losing funding could cripple local law enforcement 
efforts in counterterror intelligence due to state budget cuts for police agencies. Fusion 
centers were intended to advance a federal objective relating to anti-terror initiatives, not 
local objectives like crime.102 
State and local fusion center privacy restriction is codified under federal 
regulation 28 C.F.R. Part 23.   The law prohibits state law enforcement agencies that 
receive federal funding from collecting or maintaining personal information about 
individuals in criminal intelligence databases unless, there is reasonable suspicion that 
the individual is involved in criminal conduct and the information is relevant to that 
criminal conduct.103   Several observations arise here. First is that in counterterrorism 
intelligence investigations oftentimes you don’t know specifically who or what the target 
is at the onset of the investigation.  Second is that the Privacy Act and some other federal 
laws do not apply to the states conducting information gathering.  Third is that 28 C.F.R 
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Part 23 says that fusion centers that receive federal funding must comply.  What about 
fusion centers which do not receive federal funds?  Can they operate under less restrictive 
guidelines?   
Questions remain as to a system of sufficient checks and balances to prevent 
abuse and who would provide oversight of their activities, records and reports.104   With 
few minimum standard operating procedures or policies between these disparate law 
enforcement agencies, it sets up a system by which authorities can manipulate differences 
in federal, state and local laws and policy shop to maximize their information-gathering 
potential.105 
An additional concern is that if the information gathered by police is illegally 
obtained or done in error and then used in a vast sharing domain, the entire system 
becomes contaminated with the unlawfully obtained information.  Worse yet is that 
arrests and prosecutions can end up being based on illegally obtained information in 
violation of someone’s civil liberty or privacy.106 
I. COST OF MAINTAINING GOVERNMENT SECRETS 
Are the gains in security worth the funds expended?107 The cost associated with 
homeland security domestic intelligence operations such as infrastructure protection, 
government surveillance, secrecy, and classification of documents and information has 
come into question.  In the years immediately following the terror attacks of 9/11, it was 
understandable to initiate new public policy and to spend whatever was needed to protect 
the homeland.108  The problem however is that policymakers and Congress have not 
properly assessed the return on investment. 
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A source of harm is identified and then money is spent to do something about it 
without ever justifying the cost.109  Infrastructure protection such as the commercial 
airline industry was secured by the formation of the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) that has an annual budget of $8.2 billion dollars.110  Enhancing 
resiliency by fortifying cockpit doors at a cost of $30-50,000 each, for a total of about 
$40 billion from a cost benefit analysis made more sense economically and with less 
inconvenience to airline passengers. This may also have negated the need to intrude into 
the privacy of airline passengers with screening, and may have saved airline corporations 
the cost associated with flight delays.  
After the 9/11 attacks, Osama Bin Laden’s stated goal was to bankrupt the United 
States on security spending.111  Over the last decade, spending on homeland security 
activities has increased by $360 billion and the total exceeds $1 trillion.112  More 
homeland security spending, means less money available for education, healthcare, 
economic development, housing, infrastructure improvements, and national defense.  
Some of the cost is associated with overlap and duplication by having so many 
different agencies involved in homeland security activities each with their own mission, 
their own culture and their own reporting systems.113   This struggle in developing a true 
fusion process to fill gaps in information sharing, a proactive collection of information 
and value added analysis still remains.114  Might this be accomplished by having a single 
integrated domestic intelligence agency?  This policy option will be examined further in 
chapter three. 
Determining the appropriate level of homeland security spending requires 
thoughtful and rational debate and discussion outside the realm of hyperbole, hysteria and 
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fear that often dominates the discourse.115  If we do not have this dialogue now, more 
than ten years removed from the fog of 9/11, and ask ourselves if the policies we are 
enacting to defend the homeland are lawful and reasonable, we might lose on both fronts.  
Balancing security and liberty, the main thrust of this thesis, is important in our 
approach to domestic intelligence activities in the United States.  After ten plus years, the 
debates in Congress, the media and the public, are increasing to the point of blowback.116  
This may result in the domestic intelligence enterprise returning to operating at a distinct 
disadvantage as it was forced to do prior to the 9/11 attacks under laws governed by the 
Privacy Act.  Prior to the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, a higher government 
threshold for obtaining court orders to search suspect activity was the standard for 
government surveillance.  
J. METHODOLOGY 
Using policy options analysis, I will examine three homeland security policies.  
After an analysis of the impact of those policies on the three key stakeholder groups, I 
will develop a policy recommendation that satisfies privacy protections of civil liberty 
advocates, security needs for domestic intelligence agencies and that will be found to be 
politically acceptable to members of Congress and the American public.  
I will conduct this policy analysis using six steps: 
 Analyze the problem (see Chapter II) 
 Identify criterion that will mitigate the problem 
 Analyze alternative policy choices as solutions 
 Compare the alternatives against the criteria to determine the advantages 
and disadvantages of each policy 
 Recommend a preferred policy 
 Suggest a way to implement the policy 
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Policy alternatives that will be examined are the following:  
 Examining the status quo allowing government agencies expanded 
intrusion into areas previously constitutionally protected. 
 Dismantling the fragmented approach to U.S domestic intelligence and 
replacing it with an integrated security agency and the consequences that 
would result.  An examination of MI5.  
 Strengthening trusted oversight mechanisms currently in place and 
determining an adequate oversight metric to audit progress and reporting 
and making adjustments when necessary to sustain the appropriate balance 
of privacy and security. 
A recommendation will be made from those alternatives as a way forward until 
future problems arise. This balance between security and liberty will always need to be 
revisited as new technologies emerge and the means with which government can exploit 
conducting intelligence operations changes quickly. 
This chapter has covered the extensive background of U.S. domestic intelligence, 
identified key issues, provided a problem statement and posed the research question to be 
answered in this thesis.  Areas of controversy are: 
 Expanded government surveillance authority 
 Effective congressional and judicial oversight of domestic intelligence 
activities to prevent privacy abuses 
 The disparate nature of U.S. domestic intelligence and whether a single 
domestic intelligence service like MI5 would instill more accountability.  
Chapter III will be a review of the literature on the issue of domestic intelligence 
activity and the impact it is having on privacy and civil liberty in the years following 
9/11. 
 24
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States, a 
new concept made its way into the American lexicon. We call it homeland security.  
America was made to face the reality that our security and the way of life we had taken 
for granted would have to change. Our national government scrambled to give Americans 
peace of mind about their safety in the days and years that followed the attacks in New 
York, Pennsylvania and Washington D.C.  On the other side of the discussion are civil 
libertarians, who fear giving government a blank check to determine the cost of this 
expanded encroachment on privacy and civil liberties. 
This literature review will examine government reports, research and writings by 
noted authors, speeches by government officials, and essays and journals, and lay out 
what is generally agreed on in the areas of civil liberty and homeland security.  
Additionally, literature review will be on issues and concerns that have arisen in the 
decade following 9/11, which saw expanded government authority granted to domestic 
intelligence agencies. Questions have arisen as to whether a red line exists for advocates 
of civil liberties where they begin to push back in the direction of more liberty at the 
expense of security.    
B. WHERE IS THERE AGREEMENT?  
The themes that emerged from the literature review focused on balancing the need 
for further government intrusion to protect the homeland; stricter oversight of domestic 
intelligence agencies that include the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces and state and local fusion centers; and a lack of public trust of government 
operating in secrecy. There is almost universal agreement through the literature reviewed 
of the need to balance security with maintaining liberty, and that the choice between 
liberty and security is a false choice.117  The 9/11 Commission Report to Congress 
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pointed out that in wartime, government calls for greater power, and then for those 
powers to recede after the war ends.118  The Global War on Terror (GWOT) is in its 
eleventh year with no end in sight.  The public tends to be willing to forego individual 
freedoms in the early stages following a terror attack, but as they move further from the 
event, the infringements on their liberty spark intense debate.  Protecting civil liberties, 
while effectively combating terror, continues to be debated in Congress. 
The literature points out that the push for more government security at the 
expense of civil liberty is not coming from the public, but rather from government 
domestic intelligence agencies and officials.  In August 2002, the National Commission 
on Terrorism (NCT) argued for a more aggressive strategy in combating terrorism.119  
Critics of this approach argue that those conclusions and recommendations ignore U.S. 
privacy interests that might lead to curbing individual rights and liberties.120 
Another report for Congress raises questions in responding to anti-terror efforts, 
stemming from the conflict between individual privacy interests and the intelligence 
needs of law enforcement and national security.121  Instead of looking for balance, the 
NCT report previously cited advances that push for more government intrusion by calling 
for all government agencies to use every available means to thwart terrorism.122  With the 
roles that technology and the Internet play in the GWOT, critics fear that the potential for 
abuse and harm by government officials with an increased capacity to assemble 
information, will result in increased and unchecked government power.123 
Review of a journal article on the question of sacrificing liberty in the name of 
increased terrorism protection points out the good news/bad news result.  The author 
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writes that the domestic intelligence system appears to have been successful in increasing 
security within the U.S., but that the gains are coming at the cost of ever-increasing 
domestic surveillance and at the risk of civil liberties.124  The public is not asking to have 
their freedom from unnecessary government intrusion scaled back.  It is becoming a 
situation of mandatory compliance. Critics argue that the balance between security and 
liberty has shifted firmly toward security, leading to greater government power. 125  
Oversight by the same branch of government that is executing domestic intelligence 
raises issues of credibility in the watch system.  
A 2007 American Civil Liberties Union report about state and local fusion 
centers, raises serious privacy issues at a time when government power and zeal in the 
GWOT are threatening privacy at an unprecedented level.126  In the report they express 
that fusion center planning and design for the most part occurred without public planning 
or debate.  Little training of personnel has taken place on civil liberty protection and the 
potential for abuse is great.  
Public trust is a common theme in the literature due to the sensitive nature of what 
the government is doing in spying on U.S. citizens.  In a Pew Research Center study on 
American trust in government, a poll showed that a majority of Americans (53%) think 
that the federal government threatens their rights and freedoms.127  In a system of 
government that derives its authority by the consent of the governed public, trust is at the 
foundation of the policies of homeland security.  The report goes on to indicate that for 
the first time, a majority of the public says that the federal government threatens their 
personal rights and freedoms.128 
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Another review of literature concerning government threatening personal rights 
and freedoms points out that this lack of trust transcends political party affiliation and 
political ideology. Whether political partisanship plays a role in privacy protections, one 
author argues that both political parties have sought to maximize government’s control 
over its citizenry.129  Author James Bovard cites instances showing that erosion of 
personal rights have occurred in the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations, with 
increases in wiretapping and searches of electronic communications due to emerging 
technology.130 
Government use of emerging technologies to spy on people in public spaces has 
raised concerns from civil liberty advocates.  In a review of literature from the General 
Accounting Office on the use by law enforcement of closed circuit television to monitor 
public areas to combat terrorism, civil liberty advocates stress the need for controls to 
ensure individual privacy that establish supervision, training requirements, public 
notification and periodic audits.131  Written policies, standard operating procedures, along 
with credible training and oversight through periodic audits, are a common theme in 
much of the literature. The ACLU and the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) 
and the American Bar Association (ABA) are a few of the watchdogs of government’s 
expanding authority post 9/11.  The ACLU and EPIC have argued that the use of 
surveillance systems to monitor public spaces may, nevertheless, infringe upon freedom 
of expression under the First Amendment, believing that it might “chill” protestors from 
demonstrating in public spaces.132 
In a review of literature on fusion center recommendations, a group of policy 
experts and legal practitioners write that although fusion centers have the potential to 
strengthen the nation’s counterterrorism efforts, without effective limits on data 
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collection, storage, and use, these centers can pose serious risks to civil liberties, 
including rights to free speech, free assembly, freedom of religion, and the right to be free 
of unnecessary government intrusion.133  The lack of mandatory compliance to any 
consistent standards is cited often in reports on state and local fusion centers.  The 
recommendation report points out that any time law enforcement agencies collect 
information on people in the United States it could result in the creation of vast databases 
compiled on individuals without reasonable suspicion that they are linked to any 
terrorism or criminal activity.134  A lack of proper training, reporting, and oversight came 
up in this report as well. 
One of the most pressing concerns involving fusion centers is a lack of 
accountability due to the secrecy that surrounds these centers, which makes public 
oversight more difficult.135  Secrecy surrounding the domestic intelligence enterprise 
makes it difficult to determine whether effective and consistent oversight is occurring and 
whether civil liberties are actually being safeguarded.  Authors Priest and Arkin raise the 
concern of potential civil liberty abuse in the name of national security.  They refer to it 
as government being allowed to operate in the dark.136 In their book, Top Secret 
America, they cite testimony by CIA Counterterrorism Center head, Cofer Black, who 
told Congress that he had been granted new forms of “operational flexibility” in dealing 
with suspected terrorists, and followed that up by telling Congress it was all they needed 
to know.137  This makes it difficult for Congress to perform effective oversight. 
These same authors explore the government’s use of Predator drones that had 
been hidden in layers of government secrecy.138  The use of drones for surveillance in the 
United States by domestic intelligence agencies including local police and fusion centers 
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has become a topic of much controversy, not only in Congress, but in state legislatures as 
well.  Several states have already passed laws and more are drafting legislation banning 
the use of these surveillance devices, seeing them as too much of an encroachment on 
privacy and civil liberties.139 
In a related review of writings on the tug of war to determine just where the line 
should be drawn between stronger powers the government insists are needed to protect 
Americans from terror, versus the protections of civil rights and liberties that are 
fundamental to American democracy, academic Donald Kettl writes and lectures about 
balancing liberty and protection.140  In writing about the Patriot Act, he indicates how 
civil libertarians worried that Congress would rush to enact sweeping new legislation 
without deliberating on the impact it would have on civil rights and civil liberties, while 
security experts struggled to find a way to balance civil liberty against the need for a 
stronger homeland defense.141Kettl, like Bovard had mentioned previously, points out 
that people describing themselves politically as libertarians, conservatives, as well as 
liberals, worry that post 9/11 changes have the potential to place too many restrictions on 
liberty.142 
C. WHERE IS THERE DISAGREEMENT? 
A review of the literature citing the need for increased government power for 
domestic intelligence agencies in the GWOT is framed as the price to be paid in 
protecting the homeland.  Domestic intelligence agencies are one of the few government 
entities in support of expanded government encroachment at the cost of civil liberties.  
The literature reviewed in this area does not indicate that government domestic 
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intelligence agencies come right out advocating for infringing on civil liberties. Instead, 
their narratives focus solely on the need for more security.   
A New York Times newspaper article (May 7, 2013), writes about a push by the 
FBI to overhaul surveillance laws that would make it easier to wiretap people who use 
the Internet, aimed at preserving law enforcement officials’ longstanding ability to 
investigate suspected criminals, spies and terrorists due to evolving technology.143   The 
article points out that this plan will likely set off debate over the future of the Internet, 
according to lawyers for technology companies, over Internet privacy and freedom.144 
In a review of a lecture by scholar Tom O’Conner (PhD), he outlines the practice 
of government’s infringing on civil liberty by retaining law and order at any expense, and 
points out that Thurgood Marshall stated that grave threats to liberty often come in times 
of urgency.145   The issue of how to balance fighting terror and protecting liberty is 
difficult to achieve and even harder to maintain. O’Conner’s lecture touches on how 
terror attacks unfortunately lead to inflating every national security crisis into the need 
for some overly repressive “do anything, do something” knee-jerk response, but that there 
may in fact be no need for new laws, new agencies, or new government powers.146  
Expanded government intrusions following 9/11 make it easier today for authorities to 
justify secret wiretaps and surveillance since probable cause under the Foreign 
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In reviewing an article on the need for fusion centers to spy on U.S. citizens 
without legal authorization, one Arkansas fusion center director indicated that they spy 
not on Americans, just on anti-government Americans.  He then played the patriotism 
card saying, “I do what I do because of what happened on 9/11.  There is this urge, this 
feeling inside that you want to do something.148 
The literature generating the most disagreement and controversy is on the Patriot 
Act.  This act, according to a report from the ACLU, expanded government authority to 
pry into the private lives of people whether or not there is any evidence of wrongdoing.149  
Proponents of the act say that reducing individual liberties during a time of national 
security crisis is both reasonable and necessary; that if a person isn’t doing anything 
wrong there should be no fear.150  This report was in anticipation of the reauthorization of 
certain provisions of the act to be taken up by Congress. 
The Department of Justice on its website issued a report defending the need for 
the Patriot Act, downplaying its controversy by indicating that Congress took existing 
principles and slightly modified and updated them so law enforcement could deal with 
new threats and technology used by terrorists in the GWOT.  Many others see this as the 
most substantial change in the government’s relationship with its citizens since the 
American Revolution.151 
D. CONCLUSION 
The question of what should be the reach of government in its domestic 
intelligence responsibility is as controversial today as it was after the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security, the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPR), and the Patriot Act.  There are problems with 
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oversight in an area where government secrets preclude outside stakeholders like the 
ACLU, Congress, and the general public, from effectively keeping watch on government 
activities.  It is being questioned by congressional members, the media and privacy 
advocates, and will be expanded on in Policy Option Three (More Effective Oversight) 
whether the government should be allowed to monitor itself or whether a non-
governmental entity would build objectivity into the oversight process. 
If a gap exists in the literature on civil liberties and domestic intelligence, it 
surrounds who the arbiter should be as to when intrusion is enough or too much.  It is 
difficult to establish a metric by which to gauge.  It comes down to a sentiment on how 
much latitude Congress and the American people are willing to allow domestic 
intelligence to intrude into constitutionally protected areas.  Since terror attacks happen 
so infrequently we have to ask ourselves is any of it worth eroding away our deeply held 
concept of limited government.  
Chapter IV will identify the stakeholders involved in balancing security and 
liberty.  These stakeholder groups have quasi-veto power in any policy formation and can 
derail any alternative policy recommendations by legal means, increased secrecy, 
political means, and public relations campaigns.    
 34
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 35
IV. POLICY ALTERNATIVES 
The 9/11 terror attacks on the United States caused a change in the way federal, 
state and local law enforcement and security agencies go about preventing, detecting and 
disrupting terror plots and identifying terror suspects, organizations, terror financing, 
travel, recruitment and communications.  Terror suspects and organizations exploit the 
Internet to accomplish these activities.152 
The consequence of this is that the rise of the digital era for transfer of 
information on a never-before-seen level requires new surveillance activities and 
techniques.153The Internet also is used by people who are not suspected of terror 
involvement. Sorting it out sometimes requires vast collection of private information of 
Americans not suspected of terror.154  This is where the balance of security and liberty 
questions arises. These policy alternatives will explore what operational policy will 
insure a more consistent application of the law to protect privacy, what policy will keep 
in place enhanced surveillance techniques, and what policy will lead to more effective 
oversight?  
In order to solve the issue of balancing security and privacy, three stakeholder 
groups have been identified.  They have been determined as stakeholders based on the 
role they occupy in the apparatus or because their political influence will be needed for 
acceptance of any policy recommendation that will be made.  The stakeholders are civil 
liberty advocates, namely the American Civil Liberties Union; governing bodies 
including Congress, the Executive and Judicial branches; federal, state and local law 
enforcement and national security agencies; and finally advocates for a single streamlined 
domestic approach.  The main issues are privacy protections, effective oversight, and 
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effective domestic intelligence operations.  We must look across the boundaries that 
divide these interests and disparate objectives and come to a collaborative policy 
recommendation that accommodates each entity’s needs.155 
In a representative democracy if stakeholders feel that their views are 
underrepresented they will go away feeling bitter and will work to undermine the entire 
process. 
A. CIVIL LIBERTY INTEREST GROUPS 
The civil liberty organization that has led the way in objecting to the way the U.S. 
government has reacted in the years following the attacks of September 11, 2001, has 
been the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).  
Their objections center on surveillance of anyone generally, but American 
citizens specifically.  The First Amendment’s free speech and assembly, and the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures without a warrant, 
are several of the constitutional protection items usually cited as at issue by privacy 
advocates.156   The objections not only involve people in traditional constitutionally 
protected areas such as their persons, places and effects, but in the public sphere as well, 
as the use of government security cameras and automated license plate readers used by 
law enforcement agencies increases.157  Civil liberty advocates generally hold a mistrust 
of government and while they see oversight of government operations as somewhat of a 
check on abuses, they favor more transparency in government operations.158 
This position comes into conflict with the need to sometimes hide activities to 
protect informants that can include people from friendly nations.  Letting that kind of 
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information out might discourage people and other nations from sharing information with 
the United States for fear of retaliation by other states, and in the case of individuals it 
may cost them their lives.  Civil liberty groups have offered alternative recommendations 
that would meet their mission as a government watchdog.159  The ACLU indicates that 
Congress has ample constitutional authority to control the “secrecy regime,” and that the 
Constitution gives Congress a pre-eminent role in national security issues under Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 11 and Section 9, Clause 7.160 
B. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
Any policy recommendation will have to satisfy the concerns of agencies with 
domestic intelligence responsibility.  Their concern is having the tools needed to prevent, 
detect and disrupt terror plots and to identify terror organizations and individuals in a 
globally connected network with vast digital communications capability.161  Among those 
are the National Security Agency, the FBI, DHS I&A, CIA, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) along with state, local and tribal law enforcement.  Law enforcement 
and security agencies tout that they are sensitive to protecting privacy but their actions 
sometimes tell a different story.162  The claim often cited is that everything they 
(government domestic intelligence agencies) do is in the interest of protecting the nation 
from future terror attacks.  From the White House down to the local level, however, are 
examples where privacy took a back seat to security interests and that those objectives 
continually push its boundaries outward.163  The danger in dismissing this group in any 
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policy change is that they may as they have in the past exhibit resistance in the form of 
increased classification of information and decreased transparency.  
C. CONGRESS  
For members of Congress the issues are more self-interest in nature.  No politician 
wants to be thought of as being soft on national defense, block funding for homeland 
security needs, or wants to be wrong about the next attack occurring.164 They know that 
some government activities, although distasteful, are necessary, and at the same time 
declare publicly at every opportunity their obligation to uphold the Constitution and to 
protect privacy.  The House of Representatives narrowly defeated a move to shut down 
the NSA’s domestic phone record tracking program amid shifting poll numbers showing 
public concern for privacy, by a 217-205 vote.165 
Soon after the 9/11 terror attacks, Congress approved sweeping changes in the 
passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in the way that domestic intelligence agencies track 
the origin and destination of electronic communications.166  This broad wiretap and 
surveillance authority brought on questions and concerns from civil liberties advocates 
about oversight mechanisms and systems to prevent government abuse of privacy.167 
The 9/11 Commission Report pointed out that the system of oversight at the time 
was dysfunctional and in need of a joint committee to study the activities of intelligence 
agencies and to report problems to Congress.168 
Currently many aspects of domestic intelligence oversight take the form of 
judicial review with the non-judicial review belonging to both the Congress and the 
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executive branch.169  Any changes to this responsibility are going to need Congress’ 
approval with the goal of a policy recommendation to improve transparency, and protect 
privacy in a way that is credible to a wide segment of the public, privacy advocates, 
domestic intelligence agencies and Congress.170 
Next will be an examination of three policy proposals: 
 Support for maintaining the status quo and the need for increased 
surveillance authority by domestic intelligence services and agencies.   
 Developing/creating a single integrated domestic intelligence service by 
examining The United Kingdom’s (UK) MI5 Service.  
 Developing a more effective and streamlined oversight system to ensure 
checks and balances for privacy and civil liberty protections.   
The findings chapter that will follow will analyze the strengths against 
weaknesses of each of these policies and finally a policy recommendation will be 
proposed. 
Since 9/ll struck the gloves came off, that’s all you need to know.” 
Cofer Black, CIA Counterterrorism Center Director 
D. POLICY OPTION 1—STATUS QUO/SUPPORT FOR ENHANCED 
SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY 
1. Overview 
This section will describe the current state of domestic intelligence in the United 
States after the terror attacks of 9/11, a description of the surveillance techniques used, 
and the legal justification and support for continuing with these policies. 
The events of September 11, 2001, took away the sense of security that our 
borders offered. Our distance from the Middle East and Europe where attacks had 
happened previously was enough to shield us from terror organizations, people and 
attacks.   Government officials have vowed to never again let an attack like this happen 
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and claim they will do whatever is necessary to achieve that end.171  Did whatever, 
become an open invitation for government to exceed its limits under the U.S. 
Constitution? 
In order for government to identify this new kind of enemy then they have to be 
allowed to use everything available.  This includes techniques that may from time to time 
infringe on the privacy of American citizens not suspected of wrongdoing, including 
criminal or terrorist acts,172 if government security agencies and state and local law 
enforcement are going to identify, disrupt, deter and prevent the next terror plot because 
terrorists circulate among the general population. 
2. The Patriot Act 
One of the major gaps identified after a review of the terror attacks of 9/11 was in 
the area of the intelligence community’s counterterrorism approach.173  The law 
modernized counterterrorism capabilities by giving access to tools like roving wiretaps 
that allowed investigators to track suspects who changed cell phone numbers, and it 
authorized aggressive financial measures to freeze terrorist assets.174  Additionally, it 
allowed government to seek warrants to examine the business records of suspected 
terrorists, such as credit card information, 175apartment leases and library records. 
The Act amends 15 separate criminal statutes, creates multiple new federal crimes 
and greatly expands the authority of the government to conduct surveillance and 
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searches.176  It contains extensive revisions that expand law enforcement’s investigative 
powers to obtain and analyze personal information and allows for greater authority for 
tracking and intercepting communications for both foreign and domestic law enforcement 
collection.177  The NSA, whose mission had traditionally been devoted to foreign 
intelligence gathering, is increasing their focus on domestic communications.178 
The USA PATRIOT Act passed in the U.S. Senate 98-1 and 357-66 in the 
House.179  Many of the regulations that governed domestic intelligence operations that 
were successful during the Cold War had become outdated and they played a crucial role 
in why the events leading up to the 9/11 attacks were not interrupted.180 
A White House official said that the expanded authority was needed to protect the 
nation from terrorist threats.181  Over the next five years the PATRIOT Act helped disrupt 
terror cells in New York, Oregon, Virginia and Florida.182 
A new type of enemy exists, different from the one we could easily identify 
during the Cold War. The combatants don’t wear uniforms nor are they attached to nation 
states.  They use our technology systems, the Internet and other communication avenues 
to move undetected in the general population.183  Terrorists use financial system 
resources such as making credit card purchases, wire transfers and deposits of cash, and 
travelers checks from overseas and use ATMs to obtain money from foreign accounts.184 
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The American financial system is hooked to a global network.  No longer is it easy to 
establish whether a financial transaction is foreign or international.185 
3. Civil Liberty and Privacy Protection 
Surveillance activities might worry civil liberty advocates but this is the way this 
new enemy conducts operations. The PATRIOT Act includes judicial and congressional 
oversight mechanisms to protect privacy.  The Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC) acts as the legal approval system for obtaining wiretaps and warrants.  FISA 
judges act as the rule of law in protecting the public interest; they do not do the bidding 
of the government and are independent of the executive branch.186  This process is not a 
rubber stamp.  These courts have determined in the past that some collection carried out 
by the government was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.187 
The Constitution, federal privacy laws and stringent Justice Department 
counterintelligence guidelines all focus on protecting individual civil rights.  The 
program PRISM, (the code name for a signals intelligence address) enables domestic 
intelligence officials to collect e-mails, videos, documents and other material from U.S. 
companies like Google and Microsoft, but the government does not unilaterally seize 
information from the servers of providers.188  DNI James Clapper has called the 
disclosure of this program “rushed and reckless, with inaccuracies that have left 
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significant misimpressions.189 He ensures that there is an extensive oversight regime in 
place to protect civil liberties.190 The system of balance between security and liberty 
works well.191 
4. Data Mining 
The United States has vast communications technology and it would be foolish 
not to exploit this technology to prevent, detect, disrupt and deter terror plots.192  
Contemporary communications is divided into packets and in order to target one specific 
piece of communications requires the scanning and filtering of an entire communications 
flow.193  That means that the communications information of persons not being targeted 
gets caught up in the collection.  Terrorists are often not state actors, so data about them 
ebbs and flows in a sea of information that contains data about ordinary people.194 To 
require getting a warrant each time this happens is not only slow and eats up resources, 
but it is unreasonable for 21st century methods of fighting terrorism because the standard 
for probable cause to determine that the target is a terror agent cannot be met.195 
In the global world of communications the difference between persons present or 
not in the U.S. does not make sense because in counterterrorism intelligence, you don’t 
know whom to suspect and you need surveillance to find out.196  Communications no 
longer travel point-to-point or linear.197 Two people communicating in Europe could find 
their signal traveling through American switches.198 The old way of doing things under 
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FISA was not adequate to address technology advancements.199  White House 
Spokesman Josh Earnest indicates that this kind of surveillance has been critical in 
protecting the nation from terror threats as it allows counterterrorism officials to discover 
whether known or suspected terror suspects have been in contact with persons in the 
United States who may be involved in terror activities.200  Elementary data mining could 
have easily picked up on the location and activities of all nineteen hijackers involved in 
the 9/11 attacks.201  Research of telephone numbers would have identified four of the 
9/11 hijackers, who were known to intelligence officials, communicating with each 
other.202 Without this capability today domestic intelligence agencies would be asked to 
go back to finding the pull string in the dark that turns on the light.  You might eventually 
find it but it may be too late.  Intelligence agencies, in order to keep up with these 
technologies and those not yet invented, are going to need the flexibility necessary to act 
quickly in order to prevent another 9/11 or something worse. 
5. The Need for Secrecy 
Much of what the government undertakes in the area of domestic intelligence 
needs to be kept secret so that intelligence operations do not get into the hands of the 
enemy.  Disclosing information about the specific methods that government uses to 
collect, analyze and disseminate information is like opening up the playbook to those 
seeking ways to avoid detection.203 
U.S. Senator Harry Reid stated that, This surveillance program, imperfect as it 
may be, has done so much to help keep America safe.  We need to keep the program.204  
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President Obama believes that we have struck the right balance and that the secret 
programs, “Do not involve listening to people’s phone calls, reading the e-mails of 
Americans absent further action by a federal court”.205 
6. Conclusion 
Information turned into intelligence is needed to protect the United States from 
further terror attacks.  That is why the status quo must be maintained.  Bruce Hoffman 
refers to the tactics used as an inherently brutish enterprise, a nasty business.206  
Americans do not yet appreciate the enormous difficulty and morally complex problem 
entailed in producing reliable, competent, actionable intelligence.207  How to obtain that 
information from an enemy that hides in and among ordinary people making them harder 
to identify and their plots and plans harder to detect presents issues for debate and 
discussion in a democratic society.   
The central dilemma faced by liberal democracies in attempting to effectively 
combat terrorism has to do with the reality that confronting a serious terror threat requires 
measures that strengthen the power of government over the individual, and that in turn 
reduces the freedoms and protections that people have traditionally enjoyed before 9/11 
happened.208 
Government agencies now have the tools, the flexibility and the civil liberty 
protections in place to create an intimidating environment for terrorist networks and 
individuals.  The rapid evolution of technological change may require even more 
expanded government authority.  This is what Congress and the American people will 
have to realize in order to prevent another 9/11.  
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Chapter V will be an examination of and support for a policy of establishing a 
single integrated domestic intelligence agency using the United Kingdom MI5 service as 
a model.   
Nobody in their right mind would create the architecture we have in our Intelligence 
Community. 
 
CIA Veteran Porter Goss commenting on the U.S. approach to domestic intelligence.209 
E. POLICY OPTION 2—CREATING A SINGLE INTEGRATED DOMESTIC 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: A COMPARATIVE LOOK AT THE UK’S 
MI5 AGENCY AND PRIVACY PROTECTION 
1. Overview 
The United States has no intelligence agency fully devoted to internal security 
like the British MI5 service.210  Instead we have a disparate collection of agencies shaped 
by the Cold War, each with its own mission, culture, and operating procedures that report 
to their own director who reports to an assortment of congressional oversight committees 
and the Executive branch.211  This has been the dilemma of U.S. intelligence since the 
National Security Act of 1947. 
This disparate arrangement of domestic intelligence agencies has led to a lack of 
corporateness, defined as a mission where employees within the intelligence community 
run, function, and behave as part of a more closely integrated enterprise that works 
toward a defined common goal.212  Corporateness would remove redundancy and self-
interest, and create efficiencies within the current IC structure, and provide better 
intelligence products to policy makers.213  Corporateness would lend itself to a more 
consistent application of privacy laws and a streamlined oversight process for 
compliance. 
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An attempt to centralize the intelligence function has its origins in the 1947 
National Security Act.214  Prior to that, associates of President Franklin Roosevelt pressed 
him to set up something similar to the British Secret Intelligence Service MI6.215  He 
asked J. Edgar Hoover to expand the FBI to take on domestic intelligence and he obliged 
with a Secret Intelligence Service resembling the UK MI5.216  Roosevelt created an 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to be an MI6-like agency that would overlap with the 
FBI.  Truman abandoned the OSS in 1945.  What came out of the attempt to centralize 
intelligence with the National Security Act was the creation of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), and in the end this agency became the victim of politics.217 
The attempts to coordinate intelligence activities in the reform efforts that 
followed was fought by the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State, the 
FBI and other agencies with intelligence capabilities.218    Fragmentation is the word used 
to describe one of the problems with the disparate structure of the U.S. approach to 
intelligence.219  One defense intelligence official puts the problem this way:  “We don’t 
have much of a sense of loyalty to the Community.  We see ourselves as employees of 
agencies and when agencies get together each agency tells their people that we are 
competitors.220 
Even after all the reform efforts that followed for nearly a half century after 1947, 
the attempts to coordinate intelligence left organizational, structural and cultural 
deficiencies that contributed to or played a role in not adequately warning policy makers 
of the strategic surprise of 9/11.221  Several failures that followed the 9/11 attacks, 
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including one by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, known as the underwear bomber, and 
Richard Reid, known as the shoe bomber, demonstrate that structural deficiencies still 
exist. 
The current structure of intelligence operations in the U.S. has set up a 
competitive environment between the disparate agencies evidenced by debates over 
budgets and authority.  Members of Congress have taken sides in this power struggle by 
association to agency heads and have shown deference to them in the process. What is 
recommended by security advisors is more joint action between intelligence agencies and 
operations.222  That jointness was achieved by the reform act that established 
corporateness between the military departments in the Goldwater-Nichols Reform Act of 
1986.223 
The 9/11 Commission Report to Congress elaborated on the fragmentation issue 
concerning the U.S. approach to intelligence and the failure that resulted.  The report 
pointed out that the U.S. government must find a way of pooling intelligence and using it 
to guide the planning for joint operations.224 
Jointness also relates to standardizing the use of, the understanding of, and the 
interpretation of the Patriot Act and privacy protections.  The training of collectors and 
analysts is different due in part to each agency having its own mission.  The disparate 
nature of 16 agencies that make up the IC along with state and local law enforcement 
results in each agency applying privacy standards differently.  The FBI for example 
determined in the case of the 19 hijackers that the law only allowed them to go so far 
before what they were doing infringed into constitutionally protected areas.225  The CIA 
had a different interpretation because it was interpreting things from a foreign 
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intelligence investigation viewpoint.  This foreign and domestic intelligence divide 
created confusion in terms of privacy protection as the two organizations worked on 
intelligence gathering.226 
Will a single integrated domestic intelligence agency lead to a unified 
understanding of and application of privacy laws?  An examination of the security service 
MI5, how it functions as a security service to prevent, detect and disrupt terror attacks 
and its privacy protection review mechanism will be described next.  
2. United Kingdom MI5 Security Service-Operations 
MI5 is one of four intelligence agencies in the UK.227 Peter Clarke, Deputy 
Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in the United Kingdom articulated a 
vision for how the United Kingdom approaches counter terrorism since 9/11 when he 
said, 
So what we have done is to develop a new way of working where the 
police and Security Service now work together in every case from a much 
earlier stage then would have happened in the past to where it has become 
the daily routine.228  It is no exaggeration to say that the joint working 
between the police and MI-5 has become recognized as a beacon of good 
practice where colleagues from across the globe, in law enforcement and 
intelligence, look to the UK as a model.  No longer can the police service 
feed off the crumbs falling from the end of the intelligence table.229 
This model defines a very clear role for local police in counter terror operations 
and investigations and an apparatus for information sharing.     
The United Kingdom’s strategy for domestic intelligence to contain the threat of 
Islamic terrorism is CONTEST230.   The objectives are:  
                                                 
226 Ibid. 
227 Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons, 133. 
228 Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke lecture to Policy Exchange, April 25, 2007, 5, 
http://content.met.police.uk/News/DAC-Peter-Clarks-speech-on-counter-
terrorism/1260267589755/1257246745756. 
229 UK Metropolitan Police Assistant Deputy Commissioner Peter Clarke lecture, 5. 
230 Christopher Andrew, The Defense of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI-5, (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2009), 385. 
 50
 Preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalization of individuals 
 Pursuing terrorists and those that sponsor them 
 Protecting the public, key national services and UK interest overseas 
 Preparing for the consequences 
The British have had more experience with terrorism on their own soil than many 
other nation states and that experience can be useful in determining what works and what 
does not in counter terrorism strategies.  Police force actions like traffic stops, and 
uncovering counterfeiting or fraudulent identification are done with a mindset of thinking 
terrorism first.  This creates a hostile environment for terrorism.231 
The British Security Service, also known as MI-5, is one of three intelligence 
services, the other two being the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
and the Secret Intelligence Service known as MI-6.232 
Responsibility for domestic intelligence is vested in MI-5 and they support the 
law enforcement efforts of the 56 police forces.233  The division of labor under the UK 
model is that MI-5, whose agents have no arrest powers, gather clandestine and open 
source intelligence, assesses the threat and may take intelligence action to prevent and 
deter terrorist events.    The Special Branches of the police force pursue counterterrorism 
investigations that may lead to or result in legal action, including criminal prosecution.234  
The relationship between MI-5 and police force Special Branches ensures the flow of 
information up, down and across the spectrum.  MI-5 ensures that information used in 
national security cases can be used as evidence in court.235   This ensures that sources are 
protected and that only information relative to the prosecution is released at trial to 
protect national security interests.  
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3. A Sense of Corporateness 
Corporateness here refers to integration between all the disparate individual 
agencies and organizations that are independent of one another.236 
One of the biggest differences in the UK approach to domestic intelligence is that 
they separate their domestic intelligence responsibility/duties from law enforcement in 
terms of its function only.237  The Security Service Act of 1996 specifically stipulates that 
MI-5 was not to act as an independent law enforcement organization.238  Its closest CT 
relationship is with the Special Branches of the 56 police forces.  Special Branches are 
explicitly responsible for CT efforts with regional officers in every police force division 
throughout the UK.  Special Branch officers prosecute and assist in both CT collection 
and counterintelligence operations.239  Special Branches is vital to the success of MI-5.  
This joint effort ensures that intelligence drives operations.    
The history of collaboration between MI-5 and Special Branches has not been 
without its challenges.  Friction has arisen between MI-5 and the local Special Branches 
police in which MI-5 desk officers have sometimes sanitized intelligence from covert 
human sources in joint operations.240   This can hamper good relations if Special 
Branches begins to feel that they are getting information that has been filtered of 
important information before being shared.  The same issue plagues the U.S. Intelligence 
Community.  MI-5 gathers clandestine and open source information about covert terror 
activities and can take action to prevent and deter terror activities.241  The U.S. approach 
questions the vast amount of open source material and its reliability.    
The UK counterterrorism strategy is shaped by a culture of prevention.  MI-5 has 
no conflicting law enforcement responsibility, which then allows it to stay focused solely 
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on CT intelligence.242  Instead of having a mindset of arrest and prosecution like we have 
in the United States, they produce actionable intelligence for police Special Branches.  
The CT intelligence produced ends up being the catalyst in disrupting, preventing or 
arrest and prosecution of a terror operation.   Most of the information collected by MI-5 
comes from local police.  The model used brings intelligence operations together with 
police forces to decide the best approach to countering terrorism.  Having no arrest 
powers as mentioned earlier makes an MI-5 agent’s effectiveness in preventing terror 
attacks dependent upon a close working relationship with local police forces.243   
Everything the Service does has one objective in mind, that being to drive and support 
police force operations.  The MI-5 desk officer gets all the information collected from 
sources.  This centralizes information and prevents stovepipes or silos for information to 
be held which inhibits the sharing of information.  The intelligence report produced by 
the desk officer asks and answers three vital questions:  1) What does he have?  2) Is it a 
threat?  3) What is he going to do about it?     
A “Left of Boom”244 theory exists where a continuum has been designed that 
shows the security strategy leading up to and after a terror attack.  The objective of the 
UK strategy is to focus its resources and effort “upstream” in producing intelligence in 
the zone prior to an attack in order to prevent and/or disrupt the attack.245  The FBI 
culturally is a “downstream” organization dedicated to reviewing past events that lead to 
arrest and prosecution.246  The Tsarnaev brothers’ involvement in the Boston Marathon 
bombing is a case in point.  None of what they were doing was believed to be enough to 
continue to follow them according to the FBI.247 
                                                 
242Rand Corporation, Confronting the “Enemy Within: What Can the United States Learn About 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence From Other Democracies?, Rand Corporation Research Brief (2004), 
http://rand.org/researchareas/terrorism/index.html. 
243 Larry Irons, Recent Patterns of Terrorism Prevention in the United Kingdom,” Homeland Security 
Affairs, January 2008, http://www.hsdl.org/?view &did=482786, 1. 
244 Paul A. Smith, PowerPoint lecture, Naval Post graduate School, (January 2013). 
245 Bobbitt, Terror And Consent: The Wars of the Twenty-First Century, 301. 
246 Ibid., 301–302. 
247Feds: Boston suspect downloaded bomb instructions, Associated Press, (June 27, 2013), describes 
the Internet activity of the alleged Boston bombing suspect that did not attract the attention of the FBI.  
 53
 
Figure 1.  “Left of Boom” timetable before and after a terror attack in UK 
The British model of counterintelligence has had its share of successes and 
failures, which shows that no model of domestic intelligence can prevent all terror 
attacks.248  One example of intelligence success is the preempted attack in Operation 
Crevice, which was billed at the time as the most complex counterterrorism operation 
ever undertaken in the UK that led to life sentences for five men convicted in the plot.249  
On the other hand, some large-scale terrorist attacks were successfully carried out.  In 
July 2007, three explosions rocked the London Underground System while another tore 
apart a London bus.250  The point is that no counterterrorism approach designed by other 
similar democratic nations can eliminate all terror attacks.  More important is that the 
U.S. can continually improve their counter terror strategy by looking at certain aspects of 
models in effect in other nations that have more experience dealing with terror. 
                                                 




4. How Does The UK Approach Apply to How We Do Domestic 
Intelligence in the U.S.? 
There are several issues concerning how other democratic countries such as the 
UK approach domestic intelligence and the relationship between intelligence and law 
enforcement in those countries. There had been much less attention paid to the role that 
local police played in homeland security and protecting critical national infrastructure in 
the United States prior to 9/11.251  Once inside our borders, it is the police-not the FBI or 
CIA-who have the best tools for detecting and prosecuting crimes like forged documents, 
identity theft, illegal narcotic sales, and other minor crimes along with jail and prison 
radicalization.252 
The intelligence information is out there but it is fractured among the many layers 
of law enforcement that characterize America’s federal system of government.253  In the 
UK, the local police department, Special Branch, and national intelligence agencies are in 
constant contact with each other.254  What is missing today in U.S. domestic intelligence 
is an “all channels network” where expertise and intelligence and information can be 
disseminated quickly and effectively throughout the law enforcement community from 
coast-to-coast and from chief executives down to street officers.255 
U.S. policymakers are going to have to decide whether a domestic intelligence 
agency separate from the law enforcement function is the way forward for intelligence 
development to counterterrorism.256   Numerous intelligence reform commissions have 
attempted to centralize the intelligence function and have failed due to politics and turf 
protection.  Intelligence failures from inadequate information sharing due to stove-piping, 
that allowed incidents like the shoe bomber, the underwear bomber and the Boston 
Marathon bombing to happen, will raise this question once again.  
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Separating these functions has its advantages with a major one being that without 
arrest powers an intelligence agency is dependent on working closely with law 
enforcement.  It almost forces the relationship that the US intelligence community has 
resisted.  The result will be a breakthrough in the cultural barriers that have plagued 
information sharing between federal and local agencies.  
Keeping the intelligence function separate from law enforcement, as with the UK 
model, will provide an added level of safeguarding civil liberty protections.   MI-5 
officers are not evaluated by how many cases are brought in for prosecution or on how 
many arrests are made like FBI agents.  As a result they are less likely to engage in 
activities that skirt the law.  Arrests and cases made for prosecution can have a positive 
impact for evaluation of FBI agents.  
5. Privacy and Civil Liberty Protections in Domestic Intelligence in the 
UK 
The first and most important difference is that the U.S. government is based on 
being a constitutional republic with rights attached to individuals.  Power is shared 
between three separate branches, and a Supreme Court has the final say in interpreting 
laws duly passed.257  The UK does not have a written constitution giving rights to 
individual people and it focuses national political power in a Parliament.258 
Civil liberty protection is important to liberal democracies like the U.S. and the 
UK.  Great care with oversight for privacy protections in the U.S. rests with our Congress 
and judicial system, both of who have the final say on the constitutionality of intelligence 
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Whether to approach terrorism as a criminal act or a war is causing some of the 
confusion in the American approach to counterintelligence.  The President’s War Powers 
under Article II of the U.S. Constitution give him a lot more leverage in counterterrorism 
than domestic intelligence agencies conducting counterintelligence inside the U.S.259 
For liberal democracies, the counterterrorism strategy chosen must, regardless of 
which approach is decided on, either as a law enforcement or war continuum, not lose 
sight of what is being protected, the very existence of a liberal democratic state based in 
the rule of law.260  The liberal democratic state must provide for the maximum number 
and type of rights and freedoms for its inhabitants.261 
In the UK, Parliament plays a role along with security commissioners to oversee 
intelligence operations.  High court judges in the UK spot-check activities and operations 
of the security service for legal compliance on a routine basis.  
There are strict limitations on what MI5 can and cannot do when investigation 
individuals.262 
 An individual’s right to privacy cannot be overridden without very good 
cause. 
 The authorizations are reviewed by independent commissioners to ensure 
that they comply with the law. 
 In order to intercept telephone communications, interfere with property or 
conduct “intrusive surveillance” a warrant must be obtained which 
authorizes precisely what actions will be taken.  These warrants last for up 
to six months.  
 In urgent cases warrants may be signed by a senior official in the Home 
Office but only after the Secretary of State has granted permission.  These 
warrants last from two to five days. 
 The warrant and authorization system, together with the independent 
review process, is a legal safeguard, which ensures that MI5 does not use 
any intrusive techniques without good reason. 
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 Emergency regulations must be geographically specific, cannot amend 
basic guarantees of human rights and must be limited in time. 
 If an organization is labeled as a terror group by the Home Secretary, there 
is a provision to appeal that decision to a judicial body called the 
Proscribed Organizations Appeals Committee. 
The Terrorism Act passed in 2000, gave the UK a piece of non-emergency 
legislation but also provided for stronger guarantees for rights of suspects and greater 
allowance for judicial scrutiny.263  Detainees suspected of terror involvement can appeal 
their status to a special immigration appeals commission that at least ensures some sort of 
judicial oversight.264 
6. Prosecuting Terror Through The Criminal Justice System Versus 
War-fighting 
The UK MI5 model of prosecuting acts of terror is via the criminal justice system 
route relying on criminal procedures for arrest, prosecution and incarceration.265  The 
United States since 9/11 has approached terror for the most part as a blend between a 
war-fighting approach (GWOT) as they would a war against a nation state, including the 
use of military trials for prosecution, and a law enforcement approach (Boston Marathon 
Bombing).266 
The war-fighting approach allows for the use of any and all means of intelligence 
gathering with little attention paid to safeguarding rights to privacy and other civil 
liberties.267  The law enforcement approach is based on an entirely different philosophy in 
that it views the “enemy” not collectively, but as individuals carrying out specific 
criminal acts.268 
                                                 
263 Ibid., 84. 
264 Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons, 84. 
265 Ibid. 94. 
266 Ibid., 65. 
267 Ibid., 64. 
268 Ibid., 65. 
 58
The United States has been criticized for an overly militaristic approach to 
counterterrorism and that an erosion of civil liberties results.269  Calling the reaction to 
the 9/11 terror attack an act of war ensured that the U.S. government could justify hiding 
its activities by classifying information as secret.270 
The law enforcement approach means spending much of the time operating within 
the borders of a democratic state and are subject to the legal restrictions designed to 
protect the basic rights of the population.271  The UK has had success in approaching 
terror as a criminal matter.  Since 2005, Britain has prosecuted all terror acts in criminal 
courts and has achieved a 90 percent conviction rate.272  The trials are pursued with full 
respect for civil rights according to the head of the Crown Prosecution Service, Ken 
MacDonald.273 
7. Comparing and Contrasting U.S. and UK Approach to Counter 
Terror 
The single integrated domestic intelligence service approach is based on lessons 
from the United Kingdom’s decades of experience with strategy in countering the Irish 
Republican Army terror attacks.274  The UK has more experience in CT operations than 
their U.S. counterparts.275  The single domestic intelligence agency approach enhances 
accountability.  It eliminates fragmentation of domestic intelligence responsibility and 
establishes clear lines of authority, mission, application of laws, training and 
responsibility.  
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A major difference is that the UK as policy prosecutes terror attacks through their 
criminal courts rather than the war-making process.  The criminal justice approach 
affords suspects more civil liberties protections in the form of legal representation, an 
adversarial court process and rules of evidence for wiretap and warrant applications. 
It has been suggested in an essay by Stewart A. Baker, former Assistant Secretary 
for Policy at DHS that in the post-Cold War period the U.S. government should have 
shed illusions about the cooperation between intelligence operations and law enforcement 
operations.276  
The UK has fewer police forces and agencies than the U.S. and this makes a 
community-wide culture more achievable.  The Security Service MI5 pursues closer 
cooperation and trust with police services because they have no executive authority.  
Because MI5 has no conflicting law enforcement responsibilities like the FBI does and 
state and local law enforcement do, they have been able to focus exclusively on gathering 
information to prevent terror attacks.277  There is no FBI-type agency in the UK that has 
dual law enforcement and intelligence responsibility.  The domestic intelligence model 
employed in the UK has elements that can assist the approach taken in the U.S. to provide 
better security and to protect privacy and civil liberties. 
If the U.S. had a fully functioning internal security service acting in seamless 
coordination with the CIA, according to Charles Cogan, former Chief Director of 
Operations in the CIA, it would have had a major impact on the unfolding of the 9/11 
attacks before it could have taken place.278  The goals outlined in Policy Option 1 can still 
be achieved under this model. 
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Another emerging issue concerning local and federal intelligence operations is 
that civil liberty violations can and have occurred because of inadequate training.279 
Standardizing the U.S. domestic intelligence approach by a single integrated security 
service would standardize operating procedures, training, reporting systems and mission 
similar to MI5.  The original goal of the 1947 National Security Act to create a single 
service agency responsible for domestic intelligence has still not been achieved mainly 
due to turf wars, power struggles, turf protection and politics.280 
Balancing the need of domestic intelligence agencies to engage in activity that can 
prevent, disrupt and identify terror plans, plots and suspects with privacy and civil liberty 
protection is not a zero sum game as some suggest.281  This is a fluid state that from time-
to-time requires recalibration and retooling.  Strengthening the relationship between 
democratic principles and security through transparency and effective oversight is critical 
to maintaining public confidence.282  An adversarial appeal process in the U.S. system 
under FISA and the FISC, similar to what MI5 operates under would create balance.  
This will address civil liberty and privacy advocate concerns about activities and 
operations that have the potential to infringe on civil liberties. Public trust is essential to 
the acceptance of government investigations in intelligence operations.  
Chapter V will examine policy option three, which is how to create a more 
effective oversight process in the wake of more aggressive and enhanced surveillance 
techniques used in domestic intelligence operations in the United States.  The recent 
disclosure of those techniques leaked by NSA contractor Edward Snowden in The 
Guardian newspaper in the UK has revived the privacy/civil liberty protection debate and 
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the public acceptance for those techniques.   The details of how these techniques are 
targeted at Americans and non-Americans not suspected of terrorism have gotten the 
attention of Congress.283 
If men were angels there would be no need for government, however men are no angels. 
James Madison 
F. POLICY OPTION 3—CREATING AN EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT 
PROCESS FOR PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTY PROTECTION 
1. Overview  
At the center of the debate is providing government security agencies with the 
tools needed to protect the United States against terror attacks before it begins to 
encroach too far into the private lives of Americans and others not suspected of terror 
involvement.  The following questions will be answered in this policy option. What 
checks and balances are needed?  Is effective oversight occurring?  How will it be 
attained? 
One of the findings in the 9/11 Commission report to Congress was that 
congressional oversight for intelligence and counterterrorism is dysfunctional.284  From 
this finding the report concluded that the current oversight apparatus needed to be 
consolidated.  One of the 9/11 Commission Report recommendations is for Congress to 
create a single principal point of oversight for review of homeland security activities with 
one in the House and one in the Senate and a nonpartisan staff.285 
The goal of oversight is to instill trust through an objective verification about 
government operations.  If government is not trusted, it will be difficult for it to claim the 
moral high ground with the public that they can be trusted with activities like secret 
surveillance programs and things that are necessary to prevent terror attacks.286  The 
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reason is because terror attacks are extremely rare and the public will begin to wonder if 
the trade-off of a more intrusive government is worth it. 
The first line of oversight is self-monitoring due to the secrecy requirements and 
internal controls that are vital to improving and maintaining accountability.287  Internal 
oversight processes in the law enforcement and security apparatus may not be proving to 
be very effective.288  As former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates put it, there has 
been so much growth since 9/11, not just within the CIA, that getting your arms around it 
is a challenge.289  Instead of having the Justice Department act as the internal review 
process for compliance with privacy and civil liberties, scrutiny from an unbiased and 
disinterested party is recommended.290 
Previously mentioned in this thesis is that oversight of domestic intelligence 
activities by law enforcement and security agencies, is the province of Congress and the 
FISA courts.  Congressional scholar Norman J. Ornstein counted thirteen Congressional 
committees and more than sixty subcommittees with at least some jurisdiction over 
homeland security operations.291  The 9/11 Commission Report identified 88 just for 
DHS.292  This makes effective oversight difficult at best.  
The concern with the FISC and oversight is that it operates in secret, keeping its 
opinions sealed and has no adversarial process.293  It operates like no other court in 
America.  This one-sided government process exists nowhere else in our democratic 
state.  A recommendation for more transparency in the FISC will be discussed later. 
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2. Classified Document Process Prevents Effective Oversight 
Since so much of what goes on in the domestic intelligence enterprise is classified 
as confidential, secret or top secret it allows for government to operate with little 
transparency for the public and makes it difficult for Congress to know about possible 
illegal government action.294 
Only certain members of Congress are privy to secret briefings from executive 
branch agencies and domestic intelligence agencies.  The shroud of secrecy surrounding 
the recently leaked surveillance programs hamstrung those members in what they could 
disclose and many felt that their only recourse was to file secret letters of concern or 
protest.295  Jane Harman, a former Ranking Member of the House Intelligence Committee 
indicated that you can’t talk to anybody about what you learn in briefings and there is no 
way then for staff to do research, which would make for more successful oversight.296 
Hiding information from Congress and judicial oversight allows the Executive 
Branch to keep itself free from public criticism and increases the likelihood of illegal and 
improper activity.297  It is OK to have faith in government but asking intelligence 
officials to prove what they are saying is true is healthy.  
The authority to classify documents is done to protect information from getting 
into the wrong hands that might expose the identity of informants or sensitive 
information on investigations.298  Much of this information has been determined to pose 
no threat to national security if released.299  Former Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld believes that as a general rule too much material across the federal government 
is classified.300 
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Overclassification is an ongoing problem.   According to the 9/11 Commission 
Report, overclassification may have inhibited information sharing that may have pieced 
together bits of information that may have made it possible for intelligence and security 
agencies to have at least anticipated the September 11 attacks.301  In addition to the 
classification process throttling information flow it is a waste of taxpayer money.302 
As stated previously in this thesis, Congress has the authority and must take the 
lead in challenging laws and practices that allow little transparency in our national 
security and domestic intelligence operations.  We cannot expect officials and agencies in 
the domestic intelligence enterprise that benefit from a lack of accountability and 
transparency to change on their own.303  Change is going to have to be mandated by 
Congress and the court. 
Congress has the right under the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 and the 
Intelligence Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, to organize and manage executive 
branch activities.304  They need to leverage this authority.  The Executive branch does not 
have the right to tell members of the Intelligence Oversight Committee that they cannot 
share what they learn in briefings with other members of Congress.305  Many members 
outside of the intelligence committees of Congress and several who are members of those 
committees were unaware of the extent of the spying program.306  These rank and file 
members of Congress still have an electorate that they are accountable to and therefore 
must have access to at least redacted reports on activities of the executive branch as a 
check and balance, and for enhanced transparency. 
                                                 
301Goiten and Shapiro, Reducing Overclassification Through Accountability, 1. 
302 Ibid., 7. 
303 German and Stanley, Drastic Measures required: Congress Needs to Overhaul U.S. Secrecy Laws 
and Increase Oversight of the Security Establishment, 34. 
304 Ibid., 36. 
305 German and Stanley, Drastic Measures Required: Congress Needs to Overhaul U.S. Secrecy Laws 
and Increase Oversight of the Security Establishment, 38. 
306 Republican lawmakers: NSA surveillance news to us, news story detailing that rank and file 
members were not informed of PRISM program, confirmed by Senator Dick Durbin, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/republicans-nsa-surveillance-92418.html. 
 65
An effective oversight process is one that has people assigned to it who possess 
expert knowledge about the field of intelligence.  It would allow for probative and 
pointed questions to be asked to prevent heads nodding affirmatively about what they are 
being told.  The tendency with intelligence officials who testify before Congress is to 
inform lawmakers on what they want them to hear instead of on what they need to 
know.307  A bipartisan report in February 2003, by senior members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee expressed great frustration with the Justice Department’s refusal to 
submit to Congressional oversight.308  This is done sometimes to head off public criticism 
of some of their activities.309  In 1997, an attempt was made to rein in the classification 
“regime” when the bipartisan Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government 
Secrecy determined that the classification system is often used to deny the public an 
understanding of the policymaking process.310 
The NSA surveillance program that was leaked by Edward Snowden is a case in 
point.  Although a few members were privy to the program, they could not share it with 
the public or the media because of the claim of damage to national security.  This claim 
cannot however be substantiated and is oftentimes an exaggeration.311  It is thrown up to 
anyone in Congress questioning intelligence officials because they either do not have the 
answer, or to avoid exposing mistakes or having to disclose questionable activity as in the 
case of DNI James Clapper cited previously.  
Most members of Congress rely on staff members to keep up with the volumes of 
intelligence reporting.  This staff needs expertise and time on a subject in the area of 
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intelligence to maintain that proficiency.312  Intelligence community veterans who have 
been known to offer dissent or complain about the internal goings on would be helpful 
today as advisers to congressional oversight committees.  They have been previously 
vetted with security clearances, eliminating the need to exclude them from closed-door 
hearings. 
Much of the controversy over domestic intelligence surveillance programs could 
be resolved by declassifying documents, having a more rigorous approval process to 
keeping secrets and releasing redacted intelligence reports that may contain sensitive 
information.  Congress through legislation can and must mandate that this take place. 
3. FISA Court Reform to Achieve Balance 
In November 2002, the secret FISC handed the government broad authority to 
conduct surveillance on electronic communications conducted on the Internet.313  As a 
result it is so much easier now for domestic intelligence agencies to justify secret 
wiretaps and surveillance under FISA. 
The objective is to instill balance in the FISA court process, objectivity in its 
decisions and more transparency.  One way to achieve that is to tweak the FISC so that 
the process includes procedural aspects similar to the court process used in criminal and 
civil courts all across the United States, that being the opportunity to challenge the 
government’s or plaintiff’s assertions.314  Traditional courts in the U.S. are based on an 
adversarial process.  In criminal proceedings the burden of proof is on the government.  
In a civil case it is based on a preponderance of evidence.  If one side makes a claim, the 
other has an opportunity to contest or challenge it.  This is not currently available under 
FISA court rules. 
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Senior Federal Judge James G. Carr, who served on the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court from 2002 through 2008, offers a model to improve the court that 
should be implemented.315  The highlights of his model are the following: 
 The Court was created in 1978 as a check on Executive branch authority 
 The legitimacy of the court has come into question because of near total 
approval of surveillance requests 
 The court works off the radar screen (no transparency) 
 Congress could restore confidence in the court’s impartiality and integrity 
by authorizing judges to appoint lawyers to serve “pro bono public” for 
the public interest when legal issues come before it 
 The naming of an advocate with high level security clearance to argue 
against government filings for a higher level of reasonable suspicion 
 Having lawyers challenge legal assertions would result in better outcomes 
and more fully developed reasons for its decisions 
 The appointed lawyer could appeal a decision in the governments favor to 
a FISA court of review and then to the Supreme Court 
 In an ordinary search warrant request the target is notified at some point 
about the warrant and if indicted he can challenge the warrant or sue for 
damages.  This is not the case under FISC. 
 This puts basic constitutional protections at risk and casts doubts about the 
legitimacy of these courts 
Redacting FISA court decisions of sensitive information that might disclose a 
source or information that might need to be kept secret would then allow the legal 
decision to be reviewed, which is another way of increasing transparency. 
The experience of a judge who sat on the FISA court has to be given heavier 
weight in terms of a policy change recommendation.  Judge Carr’s suggestion for more 
transparency and balance should be considered objective because it goes against the 
status quo.  This is not typical of a government insider.  
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The focal points of this third policy option are an effective oversight policy to 
create more transparency and balance in security and privacy.  Congress can create 
transparency in the classification of secrets about government surveillance activities 
through more mandated disclosure.  Redacting the information that needs to be kept 
secret, while releasing the rest of the report, will allow Congress to play its rightful role 
of oversight.   
Judicial oversight of domestic intelligence agencies and officials will be enhanced 
by implementing an appeals process and an adversarial process in applications for 
wiretaps and warrants similar to the one suggested in Section C by former FISC Judge 
Carr. 
In order for any policy recommendation to be enacted that better balances security 
and liberty, it will have to be politically acceptable to Congress, it will have to address 
the concerns of privacy and civil liberties advocates (the public interest in this area is 
taken up by them) and it will have to be something that continues to provide the 
domestic intelligence enterprise the tools needed to prevent, deter and disrupt terror 
plots and identify suspects in an age of digital information that rapidly changes.   
Chapter V will provide an analysis of the three policy options that have been 
outlined and how the three affected advocacy groups might react to them.  The policy 
options offered are to: 
 Maintain the status quo of the surveillance state by government officials 
 Create a single integrated domestic intelligence agency for more 
accountability 
 Methods to improve congressional/judicial oversight for more 




This chapter will cross-reference each policy option proposed in Chapter III and 
cross-reference it with how willing the three stakeholder groups with a vested interest in 
balancing security and liberty in government surveillance activities to prevent, deter, 
disrupt terror plots and identify terror suspects, will be in accepting the trade-offs to 
achieve balance. 
I will assess the acceptance of the policy options by the three stakeholder groups 
on the following scale.  This score given to their position on each policy option will be 
based on the statements attributed to each and the accompanying citations contained in 
the policy option. 
 Strongly Oppose 
 Somewhat Oppose 
 Ambivalent 
 Somewhat Support 
 Strongly Support 
At the end of this assessment I will recommend a policy option that will have the 
best chance of gaining consensus from the stakeholder groups. 
1. Civil Liberties Groups Position on Maintaining the Status Quo 
As I have indicated throughout this thesis, civil liberty advocates whose mission 
statements advocate privacy protection for Americans have railed against the rise of the 
surveillance state post 9/11.  They believe it is too intrusive into the private lives of 
Americans and non-Americans not suspected of terror involvement.  Maintaining the 
status quo is a non-starter. The revelation made by the Edward J. Snowden leaks about 
NSA surveillance activity has only heightened their call to end electronic surveillance 
practices.  ACLU executive director Anthony D. Romero has called for these programs to 
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be shut down.316  He called the program dragnet surveillance and recommendations for 
improvement, too little too late.317  The government is losing the argument with this 
group on convincing them that there are enough safeguards and that domestic intelligence 
officials can be trusted to monitor themselves.318 
Civil liberties advocates will strongly oppose this policy option for reasons 
explained throughout this thesis that essentially is too much intrusion into areas 
traditionally protected by the U.S. Constitution, no adversarial challenge in the FISC and 
too many secrets that prevent effective oversight.   
2. Grade (1)—Civil Liberties Advocates and Position of a Single 
Integrated Domestic Intelligence Agency 
Although mistrustful of government intelligence operations, a single agency 
dedicated to domestic intelligence would allow for privacy groups to better coordinate 
their watchdog activities. The current fragmented state of agencies makes it difficult for 
them to navigate through the maze of information, rules of compliance and what 
congressional committee to report abuses to. This streamlined and seamless domestic 
intelligence model is more conducive to assigning accountability.319  This is at a time 
when the approach to change domestic intelligence in the U.S. is by adding layers of 
bureaucracy, like the creation of the DHS.320 
Civil liberties and privacy advocates will somewhat oppose the creation of a more 
seamless single integrated domestic intelligence agency similar to the UK’s MI5. 
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3. Grade (2)—Civil Liberties and Privacy Advocates Position for More 
Congressional and Judicial Oversight  
This policy option has the best chance at receiving the support of these groups.  
As explained throughout this thesis the biggest complaint about domestic intelligence 
activities since 9/11 has been too much intrusion in exchange for a little more security.321  
Congressional oversight is one of the few areas where civil liberties groups can file 
grievances to claims of privacy abuse since they have no standing to make claims in the 
FISC.322  Congressional hearings as a result of the Snowden leaks have provided a 
renewed debate on privacy and have made the public more aware of the extent of the 
spying. 
Civil liberties and privacy advocates will strongly support more effective 
oversight through a process of redacting and releasing more classified documents for 
more transparency.  They would also strongly support an adversarial and appeals process 
in the FISA court.  This would create the balance that privacy groups seek.  They would 
also strongly support Congress using the authority they already possess by law to rein in 
domestic intelligence activities.  This has been mentioned in the Congressional oversight 
policy option. 
4. Grade (5)—Domestic Intelligence Agencies/Officials and Maintaining 
the Status Quo  
This stakeholder group includes officials from the DHS, FBI, CIA, NSA, and 
state and local law enforcement.  Any policy change has to take into account the needs of 
this group in the digital age and with the advancements in technology in providing them 
with the tools and flexibility to prevent, disrupt, deter and identify terror plots and 
suspects. 
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This stakeholder group led by the executive branch lobbied hard for the passage 
of the Patriot Act.  They maintained that terror groups were so intertwined in the use of 
global communications that unless they had access to personal communication 
technology without having to go back to the court each time for warrant or wiretap 
approval they would always be one step behind the next terror attack.323 
This broad surveillance authority has helped thwart more than 50 potential attacks 
all over the world according to the NSA, including a plot to bomb the New York Stock 
Exchange.324  To end or even return to the surveillance rules for domestic intelligence 
agencies and services pre-Section 215 of the USA PARTIOT Act would put national 
security at risk.  Maintaining this authority is imperative and would be strongly 
supported by the domestic intelligence enterprise. 
5. Grade (5)—2) Domestic Intelligence Officials/Agencies Support for a 
Single Integrated Domestic Intelligence Service Similar to UK MI5 
This would require long-established agencies giving up turf.  This has been an 
obstacle that has not been overcome since the passage of the 1947 National Security Act 
that attempted to put this function under one agency, the CIA.  Numerous congressional 
reform efforts that followed all met with the same resistance that it always has, and 
nothing more than moving furniture around occurred.  The biggest reason has been 
agency self-interest, agency culture, politics, and turf protection.325  This stakeholder 
group would strongly oppose a move toward a single domestic intelligence service.  A 
history of reform effort failure supports this. 
6. Grade (1)—Domestic Intelligence Officials/Agencies Support for 
More Effective Congressional/Judicial Oversight 
Calls by privacy advocates and members of Congress for more transparency and 
oversight into domestic intelligence activities, has been a game of cat and mouse.  
Domestic intelligence officials testified on Capitol Hill that they are sensitive to privacy 
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and self-monitor for compliance.  The response over and over again is that too much 
disclosure presents a national security risk.   Former intelligence officer veteran Philip 
Mudd indicates that he sees little advantage an adversary gets by learning that U.S. 
domestic intelligence is collecting phone calls and e-mail records.326  One promising 
aspect in terms of reining in the vast authority given to domestic intelligence services and 
agencies is that a lawyer in the Office of the DNI recently indicated in testimony on 
Capitol Hill that the Obama Administration is open to re-evaluating this (surveillance) 
program.327 
Domestic Intelligence officials have resisted calls and attempts for more oversight 
saying it would make it more difficult to track terror plots and would somewhat oppose 
attempts at additional oversight or transparency.  
7. Grade (2)—1) Congress and Support for Maintaining the Status Quo 
In the decade following the 9/11 terror attacks, congressional support for 
increased surveillance authority in domestic surveillance operations is waning.328  Unable 
to use the emotion of another catastrophic attack against the nation as support for the 
imbalance in security and liberty that is trending toward more intrusion into the private 
lives of individuals, the pendulum is swinging back toward more transparency. 
The NSA has been reacting to the pressure for more transparency by declassifying 
previously labeled top-secret documents for congressional hearings.329  Since so much of 
what occurs in the domestic intelligence enterprise is done in secret compounded by the 
experience and time needed to navigate through this specialized activity, it makes 
effective oversight difficult.  Political pressure due in part to the Edward Snowden leak of 
                                                 
326Madhani and Jackson, “With NSA controversy, debate over secrecy is revived,” USA Today, June 
12, 2013, https://www.google.com/#q=with+nsa+controversy%2C+debate+over+secrecy+is+revived. 
327Savage and Sanger, “Senate Panel Presses NSA on Phone Logs,” New York Times, July 31, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/us/nsa-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
328David Rogers, “NSA vote splits parties, jars leaders,” The Politico, July 24, 2013, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/nsa-amendment-fails-94721.html. 
329Jessica Meyers, “Calls mount for more transparency,” The Politico, August 1, 2013, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/calls-mount-for-nsa-transparency-95020.html. 
 74
NSA surveillance programs has Congress succumbing to media and public pressure to 
scale back encroachment by domestic intelligence services and agencies. 
Congress’ support for continuing the status quo of enhanced surveillance 
programs is ambivalent at best as some members are somewhat opposed and others 
showing some support. 
8. Grade (3+ or 3-)—2) Congress and Support of a Single Integrated 
Domestic Intelligence Service along the lines of the UK MI5 
The 9/11 Commission Report that followed the terror attacks gave consideration 
to a new agency dedicated to intelligence collection and analysis in the United States.330  
They quickly went away from that direction in favor of adding yet another layer onto an 
already bureaucratic enterprise with a national intelligence center.331 
The upside to creating one service responsible for the collection and analysis of 
intelligence has been examined in Policy Option 2.  A downside is that too narrow of a 
focus on domestic intelligence does not necessarily eliminate concerns about civil liberty 
and privacy abuses and effective oversight.332 
The reality is that a single integrated domestic intelligence service in the United 
States is highly unlikely due to congressional opposition.  Congress appears to be 
ambivalent to somewhat opposed to the U.S. having a single domestic intelligence 
service.  New developments like another intelligence failure or continued privacy and 
civil liberty abuses or continued oversight dysfunction due to a fragmented approach 
could begin a groundswell of support toward this concept.  
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9. Grade (4)—2) Congress’ Support for Improving its Oversight 
Function and Judicial Oversight as Well 
Congress has admitted that the current oversight mechanism for intelligence is 
dysfunctional.333  This acknowledgment is encouraging because denial of the problem 
would continue oversight ineffectiveness.  They have recommended creating a single 
point of oversight and review for homeland security.334  This consolidation has support 
among members of Congress.  
Effective oversight to prevent privacy and civil liberty abuses by domestic 
intelligence services and agencies has been a struggle for Congress.  Few members have 
a good base of knowledge on intelligence activities or the know-how about the 
technologies being used by domestic intelligence agencies to feel assured that effective 
oversight is occurring.335 
There are indications, however, that Congress is beginning to exercise its 
oversight responsibilities by creating special commissions for more familiar committee 
hearings.336  The purpose here is to decrease partisanship out of what is becoming a very 
political process. 
Congress is demonstrating strong approval for significantly improving judicial 
and legislative oversight in calling for changes that increase transparency and protect 
government secrets at the same time.  No longer are they willing to give a blank check to 
national security interests over privacy and civil liberties.337 
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Figure 2.  Stakeholder groups and policy position 
B. CONCLUSION 
The pros and cons for support of each of the Policy Options have been discussed 
here, and the strengths and weaknesses have been detailed.  The next chapter will propose 
a policy recommendation based on each stakeholder interest to keep a sustained balance 
to security and privacy. 
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VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
 
Figure 3.  Policy recommendation incorporating elements of 3 policy options 
A. OVERVIEW 
This thesis has laid out the issues and concerns surrounding the growing gap 
between how best to empower domestic intelligence agencies due to the new threat 
presented by terror attacks, while maintaining the rule of law that protects privacy and 
ensures civil liberties.338  These are not polar opposites.339  The above image highlights 
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that I do not see this as a zero sum game where only one of the policy options is the best 
way forward.  The policy recommendation will incorporate the strengths of each option 
examined.  In doing so I am recommending incremental change, change that will not 
require a huge policy shift that is not likely to happen with the current gridlock due to 
partisan bickering in the U.S. Congress.      
The issues I have identified are keeping surveillance operations secret and out of 
the hands of the opposition yet with enough transparency of these operations for 
Congress and the public to be able to debate their effectiveness and the costs associated 
with them, and finally a system of fairness consistent with a democratic state.  The policy 
being recommending is keeping enhanced surveillance techniques in place in exchange 
for an adversarial process in the FISC, releasing more redacted classified reports 
frequently, including through the Freedom of Information Act so that a streamlined 
Congress oversight committee can effectively assess these activities.  
B. I.D.E.A.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Following are policy recommendation called I.D.E.A.S. 
 Incorporating an adversarial process for wiretap and warrant applications 
as put forth by former FISC Judge James Carr.   
 Declassifying documents more frequently after redacting them, as we 
have seen done by domestic intelligence officials in Capitol Hill hearings 
by DNI Jams Clapper and other intelligence officials for more 
transparency.   
 Educating Congress and the public on the tactics of enhanced surveillance 
by government domestic intelligence agencies on things that do not 
compromise the methods used. 
 Authority for domestic intelligence services and agencies to continue 
surveillance techniques.  
 Streamlined congressional oversight that contains One House and one 
Senate Committee overseeing domestic intelligence agencies and services.   
It will require trade-offs where domestic intelligence agencies and services allow 
more light to shine on their activities and do not reveal sensitive information, in exchange 
for keeping secret some aspects of surveillance operations. It will insert an adversarial 
process into a very one-sided FISC for balance.  It does not pass the smell test when 
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15,000 wiretap and surveillance applications were made by the FBI to the FISC since 
1978, and all but five were approved, and not even one was rejected.340 
With the flurry of activity in Congress over NSA collecting wide swaths of 
personal data it should be apparent to most objective observers that there is a problem 
with what is being referred to as the surveillance regime by the ACLU.341  It had been 
estimated that the NSA now collects 1.7 billion pieces of intercepted communications 
every twenty-four hours that includes cell phone conversations, e-mails, text and Twitter 
messages, instant messages, billboard postings, radio signals IP addresses and website 
changes.342  This collection authority must be managed with a balance of privacy 
protections. 
The domestic intelligence agencies are losing the argument for continuance of the 
programs, techniques and operations they are engaged in.  What began as a fringe 
movement against these surveillance techniques to identify terror plots and suspects, 
years and even months ago, has built into momentum against these government 
activities.343 
After initially indicating that they were comfortable with the scope of NSA 
collection of Americans’ personal communication data, lawmakers are now signaling a 
willingness to use legislation to curb those actions.344  The danger is that these agencies 
may have to begin to protect the country from terror with one hand tied behind their back 
like they did prior to 9/11 if they continue to resist calls for more transparency and more 
privacy and civil liberty protections.  If domestic intelligence officials do not acquiesce to 
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more transparency and privacy protections, Congress and the courts will do it for them.345  
People and business will seek relief through legislation and through non-Federal 
Intelligence Surveillance Courts. 
Members of both political parties are indicating that they will introduce new 
legislation that would restrict surveillance to only those named as targets, make changes 
to the secret courts that oversee such programs and allow businesses permission to reveal 
their dealings before the court.346 According to the Declaration of Independence, 
government derives its power to act by the consent of the governed.  Citizens need to be 
aware of the balance between government control and individual freedoms in order to 
prevent the government from exceeding its powers and control.   
C. MORE TRANSPARENCY CAN EDUCATE THE PUBLIC 
Intelligence has been said to be the key to countering terrorism. These sensitive 
government activities might receive more public acceptance if there was more 
understanding about them.347  That is the secrecy dilemma.  The domestic intelligence 
enterprise might do well to establish a public relations department to keep the media and 
other interested parties apprised of some of the activities going on, and at the same time 
answer questions of concern from privacy and civil liberty advocates, instead of 
wrapping themselves around the cliché that everything is classified to protect national 
security interests.   
Too much secrecy garners a sense of public mistrust no matter how well 
intentioned these officials are.  This will be accomplished with more, instead of less, 
disclosure of reports with redactions to protect sensitive information about domestic 
intelligence operations and activities.  Several classified documents were quickly 
declassified and used by domestic intelligence officials on Capitol Hill after the NSA 
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leaks.348  In another instance, DNI James Clapper said he declassified aspects of NSA 
surveillance and intelligence programs to dispel some of the myths about government 
surveillance activities.349  This makes one wonder about the classification process if 
reports can be top-secret one day and declassified the next. 
Michigan Congressman John Conyers (D) asked why the Intelligence Community 
doesn’t just tell people what they are doing.  He answers by saying because people would 
be outraged.  He adds that just because the intelligence community can demonstrate 
success in a handful of cases does not justify this level of intrusion.  Republican 
Representative Bob Goodlatte of Virginia asks why government secrets should be 
indefinitely kept.  An FISA court judge in closed testimony before a House Intelligence 
Committee hearing indicated that the one-sided nature of these courts might need to be 
restructured. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In summary, my policy recommendation I.D.E.A.S. creates the balance between 
broadened authority for domestic security initiatives and increased civil liberty 
protections in a way that improves both efforts at the same time.  Domestic intelligence 
agencies keep the increased authority that is currently in place under the USA PATRIOT 
Act in exchange for quick reaction and flexibility to keep pace with cyber technology 
changes. The balance and trade-off will be to insert an adversarial process in the FISC 
recommended by Judge James Carr in Policy Option 3. Congress must take their own 
recommendation from the 9/11 Commission Report and streamline the oversight process 
of having only one House and one Senate select committee, instead of the dozens 
currently involved, for a more focused, effective and consistent oversight of homeland 
security agency accountability. 
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VII. THESIS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
A. HOW WE GOT HERE 
The question asked at the start of this thesis was how to better balance security 
and privacy in the post 9/11 era.  By using policy analysis as a methodology, I made a 
policy recommendation in Chapter VI that focused on a more transparent process for 
effective oversight and an adversarial FISC process that protects civil liberties.  Taking a 
domestic intelligence enterprise that is shrouded in secrecy and making it more 
transparent so that the public in a representative democracy can provide input into 
whether it approves or disapproves of government activities will require give and take.   
The policy recommendation that I arrived at includes streamlining the 
congressional oversight process of domestic intelligence operations that has become 
unmanageable.  One count earlier cited in the analysis had different domestic intelligence 
agencies and services reporting to 88 different congressional committees and sub-
committees.  This adds to an already politicized process. 
B. INCREASING PUBLIC TRUST 
One problem is that there is no trust from civil liberties advocates and very little 
trust from the public and congressional members about privacy safeguards in enhanced 
government surveillance activities and operations.  In a written statement by Judge 
Reggie B. Walton, the chief judge of the FISC, he acknowledged that the court lacks the 
tools to independently verify how often government surveillance breaks court rules that 
aim to protect privacy.350  They have to rely on the honor system because they do not 
have the capacity to investigate noncompliance with its orders.351  This is in stark contrast 
to what the executive branch has been saying in trying to reassure the public about the 
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court’s oversight role.352  They have been saying that the court provides central checks 
and balances on government spying and that people should feel comfortable with that.353 
C. HOW TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENTS CHANGED SURVEILLANCE 
METHODS  
The explosion of new technologies since 9/11 has exponentially increased trails of 
data that Americans leave behind.  Just about every movement a person makes, from 
smart phone use, to credit card purchases, to computer use, including sites visited and 
Internet searches, leaves a data trail.  As I detailed in Policy Option 1, the law governing 
the use and exploitation of this data by domestic intelligence agencies and services lags 
behind the speed at which new technologies emerge.  As was indicated in the previous 
section, courts cannot keep up with the volume of information coming in.   
D. OBJECTIVES 
My policy recommendation I.D.E.A.S. calls for adjustments that both sides of the 
aisle in Congress are calling for to recalibrate the scale of balancing security and liberty 
that achieves more security and more privacy.354  We can have both. 
E. WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL IT MAKE? 
It will improve trust and understanding about domestic intelligence operations.  
For government to be successful in the area of homeland security, law enforcement 
agencies will need public help, public input and public acceptance.355 
If the public finds government operations untrustworthy in the area of 
safeguarding privacy and civil liberties, then they are unlikely to participate in what they 
see as an illegitimate initiative.  
                                                 
352 Ibid. 
353 Ibid. 
354David Rogers, “NSA vote splits parties, jars leaders,” The Politico, July 2013, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/nsa-amendment-fails-94721.html. 
355The 9/11 Commission Report, 424. 
 85
F. WHO CARES? 
The American people care, Congress cares, civil liberty and privacy advocates 
care, domestic intelligence officials care and as a student of the Naval Post Graduate 
school, I care.  The recent reaction to the Eric Snowden leaks, the congressional response, 
media response and public discussion that followed demonstrate that these groups care.  
This discussion dominated the news for a significant period of time in an age where our 
24-hour news cycle only allows for stories to dominate the front page a day or two at 
most. 
G. WHAT IS NEW IN MY APPROACH? 
I am not trying to reinvent the wheel here.  Congressional action will be required 
for my policy recommendation of I.D.EA.S. to take place.  Congress is a status quo town.  
The immigration debate is an example where the two political parties are gridlocked on 
reform.  Huge leaps in change like we have seen in the passage of the Affordable Care 
Act, and creation of the DHS and TSA are rare.  Incremental change that results in more 
security and more privacy protection is the optimal goal I am working toward in 
proposing this policy option. 
H. COSTS 
This is difficult to gauge because of, well, secrets.  It is estimated that federal 
domestic intelligence agencies and services spend about ten billion dollars per year on 
keeping secrets.356  Setting up a mechanism for more transparency and an adversarial 
system in the FISC will obviously incur some cost, but will be more than offset by money 
saved keeping secrets.  
I. CREATING THE PLATFORM 
Upon completion of this thesis I will distribute this I.D.E.A.S. policy 
recommendation for reading and discussion to Wisconsin Senator Ron Johnson, who sits 
on the Senate Homeland Security Committee.  This Senate committee has as a 
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subcommittee called the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) that has the 
responsibility of studying and investigating the efficiency and economy of operations 
relating to all branches of government.357  The efficiency and economy of the current 
classification process can begin in this committee. 
On the House side, I will distribute to Wisconsin Congressman James 
Sensenbrenner, the former head of the House Judiciary Committee, and to Congressman 
and former Vice Presidential Candidate Paul Ryan.  These are three main players in 
Congress from Wisconsin and they wield a lot of influence in Washington.  Congressman 
Sensenbrenner is the author of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.  Paul Ryan is 
chairman of the House Budget Committee.  This committee has leverage in forcing or 
influencing change in domestic intelligence services and agencies through the power of 
the purse.358  This leverage was discussed in Policy Option 3.  
Should domestic intelligence officials and the FISC slow walk the I.D.E.A.S. 
policy recommendation of more transparency and an adversarial process in exchange for 
continued surveillance authority then Congress’ funding and legal authority in the 
oversight area can be used as a carrot. 
I applied for this program at NPS and indicated that I was pursuing this degree to 
gain a base of knowledge necessary to speak intelligently about an array of homeland 
security issues, and to gain the credibility that goes along with a degree from the Naval 
Post Graduate School.  I have an established relationship with these three members of 
Congress and will use those relationships as my platform by acting as a policy advisor, 
including giving testimony before this committee.359 
Additionally, I will continue to write issue papers on homeland security-related 
topics for submission to journals, periodicals and newspapers.  
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J. HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE? 
The Platform building discussed in section G will begin immediately after this 
thesis is published by NPS.  With change there is no finish line.  The process of balancing 
security and privacy will always need to be recalibrated. 
K. CLOSING/AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
An area that I see in need of further study that could not be fully expanded on 
here because that is a thesis unto itself is whether the policy of the U.S. for terror attacks 
that occur in the United States should be handled as a war-fighting strategy or through 
law enforcement and our criminal justice system.  The pros and cons of each approach 
with policy analysis as a methodology would be my recommendation.  A model based on 
risk instead of hype should be examined. 
To prosecute terror on a war-fighting continuum leaves the psyche of the 
American people in a perpetual state of war, and the level of heightened fear that goes 
along with that strategy.360  On the other hand a war-fighting approach allows for more 
flexibility in intelligence collection and analysis as discussed in this paper in Policy 
Option 1.361 
One advantage to prosecuting these terror acts from a law enforcement/criminal 
court angle is that many of the privacy issues talked about in this thesis would be 
addressed; for instance, an adversarial court process that provides clearer constitutional 
protections and more judicial oversight and transparency.362  MI5 uses this approach.  
The cost aspect both financially and psychologically can be weighed and compared in 
this further study. 
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There is no one right way or best practice when it comes to confronting terror 
while protecting privacy.  A continual review through study and analysis of strategies, 
policies and laws will be required. 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty 
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are 
naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The 
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, 
well-meaning but without understanding. 
Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis  
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